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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The underpinnings of the global financial crisis can be traced back to 
the development of primary and secondary residential housing mortgage 
markets and the securitization of these mortgages into investment-grade 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS” or “MBSs”).  For decades, U.S. 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSE” or “GSEs”), and more recently, 
the private financial industry, created, held and sold trillions of dollars in 
MBSs.1  With homeownership rates and property values at record levels,2 
AAA-rated MBSs became highly sought-after investments by individuals, 
pension funds, hedge funds, investment banks, insurers, and government 
entities around the world.3  MBSs retained their investment grade rating 
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 1. Infra notes 65-106 and accompanying text. 
 2. Jo Carrillo, Dangerous Loans: Consumer Challenges to Adjustable Rate 
Mortgages, 5.1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 1, 4 (2008) (citing a 2007 report from the Bureau of the 
Census); Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage 
Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 956-
57 (2008) (“In 2006, 68% of all American households owned their homes.”). 
 3. See David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 1009 
(2006) (“GSEs, as the dominant purchasers of residential mortgages, have effectively 
standardized prime residential mortgages by promulgating buying guidelines.  Such 
standardization has led to increases in the liquidity and attractiveness of mortgages as 
investments to a broad array of investors.”). 
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even though, in recent years, the underlying mortgages were made to 
increasingly less credit-worthy homeowners. 
As predominantly subprime borrowers defaulted on their mortgage 
obligations, housing sales and values plummeted.  In January 2008, the 
National Association of Realtors announced that 2007 evidenced the largest 
drop in existing home sales in twenty-five years.4  By the end of 2008, 
home prices had fallen by about twenty percent,5 the biggest decline in 
seven decades.6  Furthermore, with economists predicting a continuing 
decline in home values into 2010, there appeared to be no end in sight.7  
With negative equity positions, prime and subprime homeowners across the 
country defaulted on their mortgage payment obligations.  In 2008, over 
three million residential home mortgage foreclosure proceedings were 
filed, and over two million Americans lost their homes.8 
With millions of foreclosures looming,9 the housing boom that 
supported securitization went bust.  MBSs became toxic assets.  At first, 
the devaluation effects were limited to the direct players in the mortgage 
crisis.10  Then, as financial industry players went under or faced record 
illiquidity levels,11 credit lines to businesses and consumers shut down, and 
all of corporate America felt the economic pinch.12  Some companies, such 
 
 4. See William Douglas, Home Foreclosures in 2008 – How Bad Was it Really?, 
EZINEARTICLES.COM, Jan. 18, 2009, http://ezinearticles.com/?Home-Foreclosures-in-2008---
How-Bad-Was-it-Really?&id=1893262 (“Home foreclosures rose 81 percent over the 
number of foreclosures in 2007 . . . . One of the keys to remember about the drop in value 
that many of these areas are seeing due to the number of foreclosures is that prices are down 
by 20 percent.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bob Willis, U.S. Existing Home Sales Rise on Record Price Slump, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 26, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=a9w6qyDggjL0. 
 7. See David Wyss & Beth Ann Bovino, A Deep and Long Recession, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Jan. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jan2009/pi20090123_496930.htm 
(estimating a 43% drop in average home prices by early 2010). 
 8. Alan Zibel, Meltdown 101: How a Mortgage Aid Plan Might Work, S.F. GATE, Feb. 
13, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2009/02/13/national/a140801S55.DTL. 
 9. Tom Eley, US Home Foreclosures Mount as Recession Deepens, WORLD SOCIALIST 
WEB SITE, Jan. 17, 2009, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2009/jan2009/econ-j17.shtml. 
 10. See Ryan Barnes, The Fuel that Fed the Subprime Market Meltdown, 
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, May 31, 2009, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-
overview.asp (discussing the initial effects of the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 11. Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial 
Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 5, 61-71 (2009); Ronald D. Utt, The Subprime Mortgage 
Market Collapse: A Primer on the Causes and Possible Solutions, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION, Apr. 22, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/research/economy/bg2127.cfm. 
 12. Lisa Scherzer, Credit Card Companies Shut Down Consumers’ Lines, 
SMARTMONEY.COM, May 8, 2008, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/credit-card-
companies-shut-down-consumers-lines-23036/. 
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as Home Depot, attempted to shore up their operations by implementing 
massive layoffs, wage freezes, or reductions in remaining employees’ 
salaries.13  Other companies, like Circuit City, shut their doors in what 
seemed to be a matter of days.14  Companies like General Motors faced 
inevitable bankruptcy reorganization.15  International conglomerates lost 
thirty-three percent of their value in a matter of months.16 
Americans faced the worst recession since the Great Depression.17  
More than 2.6 million Americans lost jobs in 2008, and the unemployment 
rate was headed for double digits in 2009.18  Americans who had not felt 
the direct blow of a layoff or cutback were affected in other ways, 
including trillions of dollars in U.S. stock market losses,19 skyrocketing 
credit card rates,20 the reduction of employer-provided retirement and 
welfare benefit plans,21 or newfound reduced or negative equity positions in 
 
 13. Willis, supra note 6. 
 14. Andrea Chang & Martin Zimmerman, Circuit City to Close 567 Remaining U.S. 
Stores, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 928804. 
 15. Richard A. Posner, A Failure of Capitalism, THE ATLANTIC, May 20, 2009, 
available at 
http://correspondents.theatlantic.com/richard_posner/2009/05/a_failure_of_capitalism_v--
doing_too_much_at_once.php; see also Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into 
Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1 (“[GM] became the second-largest  
industrial bankruptcy in history [on June 1, 2009] . . . .”). 
 16. Mark Pittman & Bob Ivry, U.S. Taxpayers Risk $9.7 Trillion on Bailout Programs, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 9, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNDaPlDwNZak (“The 
worst financial crisis in two generations has erased $14.5 trillion, or 33 percent, of the value 
of the world’s companies since Sept. 15 . . . .”). 
 17. Sen. Bernie Sanders, Gambling on Wall Street, POLITICO, July 21, 2009, 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25169.html (“We are in the midst of the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression.”); Pittman & Ivry, supra note 16. 
 18. Willis, supra note 6; Julianna Goldman, Obama Aides Fault Bank Opposition to 
New Regulations, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 19, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&sid=aowzfXjzjOtM (“[T]he 
unemployment rate rose to 9.8 percent [in September 2009] . . . .”). 
 19. See Heather Landy, The Stock Slump of 2008: Wrecking Ball to Wealth, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 11, 2009, at F5 (reporting $7 trillion in U.S. stock market losses in 2008); Manny 
Mogato, Global Financial Market Losses $50 Trillion: ADB Study, Mar. 9, 2009, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Economy/idUSTRE5281FN20090309 (“The global 
financial crisis slashed the value of financial assets worldwide by $50 trillion last year . . . 
.”). 
 20. See Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Credit Card Holders Livid About ‘Rate 
Jacking,’ CNN, Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/17/credit.card.rates/ 
(reporting that thousands of credit card customers are seeing increasing credit card rates). 
 21. Emily Brandon, 31 Companies That Have Cut or Changed Their 401(k) Match, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/planning-to-
retire/2009/1/12/31-companies-that-have-cut-or-changed-their-401k-match.html; see also 
Pension Rights Ctr., Pension Publ’ns, Companies that Have Changed Their Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans, http://www.pensionrights.org/pubs/facts/company_list.html (last visited Oct. 
5, 2009) (showing that twenty publicly-traded companies, including Motorola and Boeing, 
MCCLENDONFINAL_FIVE 1/22/2010  5:13:35 PM 
134 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
their personal homes.22  All of this was happening at a time when seventy-
eight million American baby boomers were nearing retirement age.23 
Much of the blame for the MBS-generated global financial crisis and 
the ensuing recession was placed on financial industry executives who took 
millions of dollars in bonuses for short-term corporate gains.24  In 2007, 
two of the top-ten highest paid CEOs work in the financial industry:  John 
Thain, Merrill Lynch CEO, received $83 million; and Lloyd Blankfein, 
Goldman Sachs CEO, received $54 million.25  In 2008, there was more of 
the same, with Lloyd Blankfein receiving $42.9 million and James Dimon, 
JPMorgan Chase CEO, receiving $35.7 million.26  Other senior executives 
also profited handsomely.  In 2008, New York City Wall Street investment 
bank employees made approximately $18.5 billion in bonuses—the sixth 
largest bonus pool on record.27  According to pay expert Graef Crystal, 
author of The Crystal Report on Executive Compensation, “top executives 
at Wall Street investment banks Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, Bear Stearns and Lehman received a combined $613 million, or an 
average of $123 million at each firm.”28  These multi-million dollar 
bonuses were primarily related to past MBS originations or sales that 
produced short-term corporate gains and were paid under existing 
contractual agreements, even though these financial institutions were 
 
announced significant reductions in their traditional pension plans in 2008). 
 22. See Les Christie, 20% of Homeowners ‘Underwater’, CNNMONEY.COM, May 6, 
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/05/real_estate/underwater_homeowners/ (explaining 
that “21.8% of all U.S. homes, representing more than 20 million residences, were in a 
‘negative equity’ or ‘underwater’ position,” meaning they “owe more on their mortgage 
debt than they can sell their homes for.”). 
 23. See Boomers International, About Boomers, http://www.boomersint.org/bindex.html 
(“In the US, between the end of World War II and 1964, 78 million baby boomers were 
born and now are part of the ‘Boomers’ generation.”) (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 24. Eric Petroff, Who is to Blame for the Subprime Crisis?, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-blame.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2009); 
Maria Bartiromo, Nell Minow on Outrageous CEO Pay – and Who’s to Blame, BUSINESS 
WEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 15, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/09_09/b4121015457000.htm. 
 25. Claudia H. Deutsch, A Brighter Spotlight, Yet the Pay Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 
2008, at B1; Frank Bass & Rita Beamish, Bailed-Out Executives Got $1.6 Billion in 2007, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/22/bailedout-
executives-got-_n_152773.html; The Highest Paid CEOs of 2007: AP, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/08/21/the-highest-paid-ceos-
of_n_120500.html; Executive Compensation 2007, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/ceo-comp/flash.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
 26. Kaja Whitehouse, Top NY Execs Made $1.2B, N.Y. POST, June 22, 2009, at 26. 
 27. Many HR Pros Want Obama’s Limits on Exec Pay to Go Further, HR.BLR.COM, 
Feb. 24, 2009, http://hr.blr.com/news.aspx?id=79620. 
 28. Del Jones & Edward Iwata, Top Executives’ Pay Takes a Hit; Bailout Plan Seeks to 
Rein in Compensation, Exit Packages, USA TODAY, Oct. 2, 2008, at Money 4B. 
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reporting then-current multi-billion dollar quarterly and annual losses.29 
Reacting to the catastrophic collapse of the financial industry and the 
deepening recession, the U.S. federal government enacted two major pieces 
of legislation.  In October 2008, President Bush signed into law the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”).30  This legislation 
empowered the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”) to use up to 
$700 billion in taxpayer dollars to bailout the financial industry.31 This 
would raise the government’s commitment to solving the financial crisis to 
$9.7 trillion, more than enough money to pay off ninety percent of all home 
mortgages.32  The Treasury’s overall program was titled the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (“TARP”).33  The first $350 billion of TARP funds was 
released to the Bush administration in October 2008, and the remaining 
$350 billion was released to the Obama administration in January 2009.34  
In February 2009, President Obama signed into law the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”).35  ARRA was primarily an 
economic stimulus act, committing $819 billion in government spending 
and tax measures.  It also contained, however, further legal requirements 
and restrictions for financial institutions receiving TARP bailout funds.36 
To address perceived abuses by financial industry executives, both 
EESA and ARRA contain temporary executive compensation and 
corporate governance restrictions for certain TARP recipients, which are 
generally financial institutions that receive TARP bailout funds in excess of 
designated thresholds.37  For example, EESA restrictions limit annual 
 
 29. See Josh Fineman & Bradley Keoun, Merrill Lynch Posts Fourth Straight Quarterly 
Loss, BLOOMBERG.COM, July 17, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=atGti_ 
UmcPnM&refer=home (detailing Merrill Lynch’s worse-than-expected $4.65 billion 
second-quarter net loss in 2008). 
 30. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3765-3933 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter EESA]. 
 31. Id. at div. A, tit. I, § 115(a), 122 Stat. 3780 (stating that the Secretary of Treasury 
was authorized to spend up to $250 billion as of the date EESA was enacted.  That amount 
may be increased to $350 billion if the President submits written certification to Congress 
that such authority is needed by the Secretary of Treasury.  Thereafter, funds can be 
increased further to a total of $700 billion if the President submits a written report to 
Congress detailing the Secretary of Treasury’s plan to use the additional amount, unless 
Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving the expansion within 15 days of receiving 
the President’s report). 
 32. Pittman & Ivry, supra note 16, at 1. 
 33. Politico Staff, Paulson’s Rescue Plan is Called ‘TARP,’ POLITICO.COM, Sept. 19, 
2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0908/13609.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). 
 34. Deborah Solomon & Greg Hitt, TARP Funds’ Second Half Set for Release as 
Senate Signs Off on Request, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2009, at A3. 
 35. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) [hereinafter ARRA]. 
 36. Id. at § 2, div. B, tit. VII, Limits on Executive Compensation, §§ 7001, 7002. 
 37. See EESA, div. A, tit. I, § 116, 122 Stat. 3783-3786 (2009) (concerning the ongoing 
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compensation to CEOs and other senior executive officers (“SEOs”),38 limit 
excess parachute payments to departing SEOs,39 “clawback” bonuses and 
other incentive-based compensation paid to SEOs where such payments are 
based on materially inaccurate financial statements,40 and impose corporate 
governance standards that affect the functioning of bailout recipients’ 
boards and the way they conduct risk-management assessments of 
executive compensation decisions.41 
This article provides an overview of what led to the financial crisis, 
identifying federal deregulation of the financial industry, increasingly risky 
federal homeownership policies, and corporate America’s love affair with 
short-term incentive-based compensation as the major culprits.  While it 
examines all of these factors, the article focuses on the federal 
government’s emphasis on controlling executive compensation as the 
talisman for curing the financial crisis.  To that end, it examines EESA and 
ARRA programs and the Obama administration’s comprehensive 
regulatory and legislative reform initiatives as they relate to executive 
compensation and corporate governance restrictions.  It concludes that the 
Obama administration’s regulation and oversight of the financial industry 
and its executive compensation structure will help the financial industry 
focus on its long-term profitability.  But, to avoid future catastrophes in the 
financial industry or other critical industries, federal regulation of corporate 
America, and additional executive compensation and corporate governance 
reforms are necessary to mandate long-term corporate productivity and 
fully discourage excessive risk-taking for all publicly traded corporations. 
Part Two of this article provides an overview of how the government’s 
historical support for homeownership in the primary and secondary 
financial markets paved the way for securitization of MBSs.42  It addresses 
how the federal government’s promotion of MBSs and its deregulation of 
the financial industry led to the securitization of a large portion of the 
subprime mortgage market.43  It also describes how Wall Street and Main 
 
oversight of the activities and performance of the TARP and agents of the TARP). 
 38. See id. at div. A, tit. III, § 302(a), 122 Stat. 3803-05 (placing limits on executive 
compensation). 
 39. See id. at div. A, tit. I, § 111(b)(2)(C), 122 Stat. 3777 (prohibiting golden parachute 
payments). 
 40. See id. at div. A, tit. I, § 111(b)(2)(B), 122 Stat. 3777 (allowing recovery of 
incentive-based compensation). 
 41. See id. at div. A, tit. I, § 111, 122 Stat. 3776-77 (dealing generally with executive 
compensation and corporate governance). 
 42. See Mark Landler & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, As Fingers Point in the Financial Crisis, 
Many of Them are Aimed at Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at A15 (quoting Kenneth 
Rogoff, a professor of economics at Harvard University, who explained that the 
government’s desire to make housing affordable to more Americans led to a freeing up of 
the lending markets); infra notes 64-106 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Jerry Kammer, Now, As in S&L ‘80s, Deregulation Blamed, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, 
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Street executives played a part in the crisis, seeing a regulatory void in 
creating, marketing, and selling MBSs and exploiting this void to generate 
millions in short-term incentive-based compensation. 
Part Three provides an overview of the multi-billion dollar federal 
bailouts as they relate to funds distributed to financial institutions.44  It also 
looks at related Treasury programs established under EESA and ARRA 
through June 2009.  Federal regulations established under EESA and 
ARRA provide the framework for temporary executive compensation and 
corporate governance restrictions on TARP recipients and for permanent 
regulatory and legislative restrictions on the financial industry, and, in 
some areas, all publicly-traded corporations.  Therefore, a review of the 
programs is necessary to the understanding of various adopted and 
proposed restrictions on the financial industry. 
Part Four examines EESA and ARRA’s temporary restrictions on 
executive compensation and corporate governance.45  It also looks at the 
Obama administration’s June 2009 permanent regulatory and legislative 
initiatives as they relate to executive compensation and corporate 
governance standards.  It then examines how EESA and ARRA’s 
temporary restrictions were not designed to prospectively change 
individual or “corporate culture,” and looks at the Obama administration’s 
proposed permanent “federalization” of executive compensation corporate 
governance standards, with criticism primarily based on the 
administration’s overreliance on TARP’s temporary restrictions for the 
development of a permanent regulatory regime and its failure to go far 
enough to essentially eradicate short-term compensation incentives among 
executives and other highly-compensated employees. 
Part Five concludes that the financial crisis and the public outcry over 
excessive executive compensation and a lack of meaningful corporate 
governance standards have paved the way for compensation and corporate 
governance reforms that go beyond the Obama administration’s proposals 
or congressional action to date.46   It recommends additional reforms 
through federal regulation, Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) amendment, 
and the development of new listing standards by Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (“SROs”), such as the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 
(“NYSE”) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
 
Oct. 9, 2008, at 1 (describing how Congress played an enabling role in the financial crisis by 
repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, allowing banks to invest heavily in mortgage-backed 
securities). 
 44. Infra notes 113-173 and accompanying text. 
 45. Infra notes 175-248 and accompanying text; see also Lucian Bebchuk, Congress 
Gets Punitive on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at A15 (discussing limits on 
executive compensation related to TARP). 
 46. David Pitofsky & Matthew T. Tulchin, Limiting, Clawing Back Executive Pay In 
The Wake of Financial Bailout, 241 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2009). 
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Quotations, Inc. (“NASDAQ”).  In concert with the federal government’s 
regulation of the financial industry, these additional reforms will promote 
long-term corporate productivity and market sustainability.47 
 
II.  PROMOTING HOMEOWNERSHIP AT ALL COSTS:  THE FALLOUT OF 
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SECURITIZATION ADOPTED BY AN 
UNREGULATED FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
 
Beginning in the spring 2008, news outlets bombarded Americans 
with stories recounting the collapse of another financial industry 
conglomerate, mortgage foreclosures, rising unemployment rates, and 
trillions in stock market losses.48  Most of these stories placed the blame 
squarely at the feet of unscrupulous industry executives who took millions 
in incentive-based compensation before and after releasing record losses to 
the public.49  Financial industry executives and their short-term 
compensation packages were the easiest targets for blame.  For example, as 
the captains of their ships, executives were responsible for authorizing 
heavy trading and investing in increasingly riskier MBSs. 
Further, financial industry executives walked away with millions of 
dollars in bonuses as their institutions reported record losses.  Despite a 
growing number of financial industry bankruptcies, failures, and increasing 
MBS losses, GSE executives, financial industry CEOs, and other highly- 
compensated and rank-and-file employees continued to profit from past 
loan origination and securitization.  In 2007, Fannie Mae President and 
CEO Daniel Mudd received $12.2 million in total compensation, and 
Freddie Mac paid Chairman and CEO Richard Syron nearly $19.8 million 
in compensation.50  Financial industry executives like John Thain, Merrill 
Lynch CEO; Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman Sachs CEO; Kenneth Chenault, 
American Express CEO; and John Mack, Morgan Stanley CEO, were 
among the top 10 highest paid CEOs surveyed in 2008.51  Other highly-
compensated financial industry employees acquired over $18.5 billion in 
bonuses in 2008.52  Mid-level and lower-level senior management at 
investment banks and insurance companies also received handsome 
rewards for promoting MBSs that generated short-term profits.53  Rank-
 
 47. Petroff, supra note 24. 
 48. Douglas, supra note 4; Willis, supra note 6; Wyss & Bovino, supra note 7; Eley, 
supra note 9; Scherzer, supra note 12. 
 49. Petroff, supra note 24; Bartiromo, supra, note 24. 
 50. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Congress Floats Fannie, Freddie Salary Caps, ABC NEWS, 
July 22, 2008, http://abcnews .go.com/Business/Story?id=5423870&page=1. 
 51. Deutsch, supra note 25. 
 52. Many HR Pros Want Obama’s Limits on Executive Pay to Go Further, supra note 
27. 
 53. Many HR Pros Want Obama’s Limits on Executive Pay to Go Further, supra note 
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and-file commercial bank and mortgage company loan officers received 
bonuses for the quantity of loans, not the quality.54  To maximize volume, 
loan officers and their superiors had no financial incentive to screen 
applicants,55 including applicants’ income documentation, credit history, 
credit worthiness, or long-term ability to repay.56  All of the above profited 
from past short-term performance benchmarks based, in large part, on 
creating, buying, and selling MBSs.   
But the blame does not start or stop there.  Responding to questions 
submitted to him by Nina Eaton, Washington editor of Fortune Magazine, 
President Obama made the following statement: 
The truth is that there is plenty of blame to go around.  Many 
Americans took out loans they could not afford.  Others were 
enticed into loans they did not understand by lenders trying to 
make a quick profit.  Investment banks bought and packaged 
these questionable mortgages into securities, arguing that by 
pooling the mortgages, the risks had been reduced.  Credit 
agencies stamped these securities with their safest rating when 
they should have been labeled “Buyer Beware.”  And as the 
bubble grew, there was almost no accountability or oversight 
from anyone in Washington.57 
There is indeed plenty of blame to go around.  In this author’s view, the 
blame starts at the federal level, with the federal government’s unwavering 
support for homeownership and its deregulation of a financial industry that 
is incapable of self-regulating.   
 Predating the federal government’s aggressive promotion of 
homeownership and deregulation efforts, MBS investments were virtually 
nonexistent.  Commercial banks and thrifts, the historical loan originators,58 
 
27; Del Jones & Edward Iwata, CEO Pay Takes a Hit in Bailout Plan, USA TODAY, Sept. 
28, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2008-09-28-executive-
pay-ceo_N.htm (citing pay expert Graef Crystal, author of the Crystal Report on Executive 
Compensation). 
 54. Bartiromo, supra note 24, at 15. 
 55. Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk:  Global Implications Of The Securitization of 
U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 123 (2008); see also Subprime and Predatory 
Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market Conditions, and Effects on Regulated 
Institution, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the Comm. 
on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 6-8 (2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairwoman, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company) (discussing predatory lending). 
 56. Unterman, supra note 55, at 83-84. 
 57. Nina Easton, Obama: How to Get Business Going, FORTUNE, Apr. 19, 2009,  
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/17/news/companies/obama_business.fortune/. 
 58. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as 
Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 312 (2005) (“Prior to the 1990s, 
mortgages were almost exclusively originated and financed by heavily regulated, traditional 
bank-and-thrift depository institutions.”). 
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normally held onto mortgages “from cradle to grave.”59  This practice 
affected their ability to expand the primary mortgage market.  They 
originated new loans only when there were adequate deposits in customers’ 
savings accounts or old mortgages were repaid with interest.60  Keeping the 
loans on their books affected not only loan origination, but also limited the 
mortgage loan applicant pool.  Commercial banks and thrifts generally 
issued new loans to only the worthiest of borrowers (prime borrowers) and 
rejected applicants with credit “blemishes” (subprime borrowers).61  Within 
this context, there was little, if any, secondary mortgage market to support 
mortgage securitization. 
Also, federal regulatory law limited the activities of financial industry 
players.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited any one institution 
from acting as both a commercial bank and an investment bank or as a 
bank and an insurer.62  This mandated separation limited commercial banks, 
thrifts, investment banks, and insurance companies from increasing their 
involvement in the primary mortgage market or facilitating the creation of a 
secondary mortgage market.63 
Then, based on the perceived benefits of homeownership,64 the federal 
government changed the financial industry landscape through the creation 
of numerous federal and private agencies and programs dedicated to the 
protection and promotion of homeownership.65  At the top of the list, 
 
 59. Moran, supra note 11, at 32. 
 60. Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home 
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 766 (2005) (“Until as late as the 1960s, mortgage lending occurred on a 
predominantly local scale; neighborhood banks and savings and loans lent homeowners 
money that was financed by the savings of people in the community where the mortgage 
property was located.  Lenders held these loans in their portfolios until maturity or the sale 
of the property.  The availability of mortgage money was linked to the amount of savings in 
the community.”). 
 61. James D. August et al., Survey of Finance Companies, 1996, 83 FED. RES. BULL. 
543, 549 (1997). 
 62. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162. 
 63. Harvey L. Pitt, Bringing Financial Services Regulation into the Twenty-First 
Century, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 317 (2008) (“In the first 100 days of the New Deal, 
Congress passed the Glass-Steagall Act, created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and mandated separation of commercial and investment banking.”). 
 64. See Godsil & Simunovich, supra note 2, at 949 (“Property ownership ties one to the 
larger community in myriad ways.  As compared to renters, homeowners—even those with 
the same income, education, and other socioeconomic characteristics—tend to be more 
civically active and more apt to engage in market transactions linked to their homes.  Losing 
this link to the larger market and community will harm a family’s long-term prospects.  
When many families lose these connections, whole communities suffer.”). 
 65. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Rural and Community Development, 
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rhs/common/indiv_intro.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) 
(describing rural homeownership programs); U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., Fed. 
Housing Admin., http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/fhahistory.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 
MCCLENDONFINAL_FIVE 1/22/2010  5:13:35 PM 
2009] REFORMING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 141 
 
federal legislation created two GSEs that can be singled out as both 
dominant forces behind the development of the primary and secondary 
mortgage markets and key players in today’s financial crisis:66  the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”)67 and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”).68  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are privately owned, publicly-traded companies created and regulated 
by the federal government.69  They perform two interrelated functions.  
First, they facilitate the growth of the primary and secondary mortgage 
markets by purchasing mortgages and MBSs for their own accounts.70  
Second, they issue and guarantee MBSs to domestic and foreign 
investors.71 
As the first GSE on the scene, Fannie Mae initially purchased only 
loans that were insured by either the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”) or the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).72  When 
 
2009) (describing functions of Federal Housing Admin.); U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 
Home Loan Guaranty Servs., http://www.homeloans.va.gov/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) 
(listing information about Veterans Affairs home loans).  An exhaustive list is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
 66. Greg Griffin, Homeownership Push Seen as Top Culprit in Crisis, DENVER POST, 
Oct. 5, 2008, at K01. 
 67. See Fannie Mae, About Fannie Mae, http://www.fanniemae.com/about/index.html  
(explaining Fannie Mae’s congressional charter and its broad “mission to provide liquidity, 
stability and affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets.”). 
 68. See Freddie Mac, About Freddie Mac, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/ (“Every day we help millions of 
families in neighborhoods across America buy their own homes or enjoy quality and 
affordable rental housing by linking them to the world’s capital markets.”). 
 69. See Fannie Mae, supra note 67 (“Fannie Mae was established as a federal agency in 
1938, and was chartered by Congress in 1968 as a private shareholder-owned company.”);  
see also Freddie Mac, About Freddie Mac, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/faqs/index.html (last visited Sept. 
27, 2009) (explaining as a GSE, Freddie Mac is “a shareholder-owned company created by 
Congress to serve a public purpose.”). 
 70. Fannie Mae, supra note 67 (“Fannie Mae operates in the U.S. secondary mortgage 
market. Rather than making home loans directly to consumers, we work with mortgage 
bankers, brokers and other primary mortgage market partners to help ensure they have funds 
to lend to home buyers at affordable rates. We fund our mortgage investments primarily by 
issuing debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets.”); Freddie Mac, 
supra note 69 (“Freddie Mac supports liquidity and stability in the secondary mortgage 
market through two principal lines of business. Our credit guarantees business purchases 
residential mortgages and mortgage-related securities in the secondary mortgage market, 
securitizes these mortgages and subsequently sells them to investors as mortgage-backed 
securities. We also have a portfolio investment business that purchases mortgages for our 
mortgage-related investments portfolio.”). 
 71. Reiss, supra note 3. 
 72. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structures Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2185, 2195 (2007) (discussing predatory home loans); William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & 
Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, TAX 
NOTES, June 18, 2007, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001084 
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Fannie Mae’s mission was expanded to purchasing conventional loans,73 
commercial banks and thrifts increased both their loan volume and their 
loan applicant pool.74  When Freddie Mac joined Fannie Mae in 1970, both 
GSEs expanded the primary and secondary mortgage markets by 
purchasing and selling first conventional loans and then non-conventional 
loans.75 
Private securitization, changes to federal laws and deregulation of the 
financial industry facilitated Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the financial 
industry’s development and securitization of both the prime and subprime 
mortgage markets.76  Private securitization began in the 1970s, with Bank 
of America and the investment-banking firm of Salomon Brothers creating 
their own bundled financial products.77  Mortgages were purchased from 
 
_Encouraging_Homeownership.pdf (finding inefficiencies and inequities in federal tax 
policies towards housing). 
 73. See Carrozzo, supra note 60, at 800 (stating that on February 14, 1972, Fannie Mae 
entered the conventional mortgage market, marking “the first auction of commitments for 
the purchase of conventional single-family mortgages.”); see also Allie Mae, History of 
Fannie Mae, http://www.alliemae.org/historyoffanniemae.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) 
(noting on the timeline that in 1970 “Fannie Mae stock (FNM) [wa]s listed on the New York 
and Pacific Stock exchanges” and “President Nixon sign[ed] legislation authorizing Fannie 
Mae to purchase conventional mortgages.”). 
 74. See Carrozzo, supra note 60, at 799-802 (discussing the revolution of the 
securitization of conventional loans by Fannie Mae and the boom in loans provided). 
 75. See Emergency Home Finance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (2000) (stating that 
Freddie Mac is a privately owned company that is regulated by the federal government and 
its primary business is to buy mortgages from lenders, package the mortgages into 
securities, then guarantee and sell securities to investors).  Compare Peterson, supra note 
72, at 2198 (discussing Fannie Mae) and Freddie Mac, Company Profile, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/company_profile/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) 
(discussing the same) with Ginnie Mae, About Ginnie Mae, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/about/about.asp?Section=About (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) 
(explaining that the third GSE, the Government National Mortgage Association, or Ginnie 
Mae, functions differently than Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac as its stated mission is to 
guarantee “investors the timely payment of principal and interest on MBS backed by 
federally insured or guaranteed loans,” which are primarily loans insured by the FHA and 
the VA). 
 76. See Griffin, supra note 66 (describing several factors leading to the financial crisis, 
chief among them the relaxation of lending standards); Robert Farley & Angie Drobnic 
Holan, What Caused Crisis? No One Thing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at 1A 
(discussing the myriad of factors leading to the financial crisis); Shah Gilani, How 
Deregulation Eviscerated the Banking Sector Safety Net and Spawned the U.S. Financial 
Crisis, MONEYMORNING.COM, Jan. 13, 2009, 
http://www.moneymorning.com/2009/01/13/deregulation-financial-crisis/  (pointing to 
deregulation as the key cause of the economic meltdown). 
77.  See JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, MARKET-NEUTRAL INVESTING 121-22 (Kathleen Peterson ed., 
Bloomberg Press 2000):  
In 1978, Bob Dall, a Salomon Brothers trader, together with Stephen 
Joseph, created the first private issue of mortgage securities.  In the deal, 
Bank of America sold, in the form of bonds, home loans it had made to 
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commercial banks or thrifts, repackaged as bonds, sorted according to risk, 
certified by bond-rating agencies, and either contributed to a trust where 
investors were the named beneficiaries or sold outright to investors.78  In 
other words, the private financial industry had begun its own process of 
mortgage securitization, with each player in the process (commercial 
banks, investment banks, credit rating agencies, trustees, etc.) generating a 
fee.79 
Changes in federal law and deregulation began in the early 1980s.80  
Two federal income tax law changes encouraged homeownership and 
financial industry creativity.  First, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 continued 
the tax deduction for interest paid on home loans, while generally 
prohibiting the deduction of interest paid on other consumer loans.81  
Second, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 exempted most residential home 
sales from capital gains tax.82  These acts stimulated demand among 
consumers for new home loans and home equity loans, and commercial 
banks turned to the GSEs to securitize loans off the formers’ books and to 
provide banks with the capital necessary to meet growing consumer 
needs.83 
Then came two rounds of financial industry deregulation.  The first 
round began in the early 1980s.  The Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 preempted state usury ceilings for most 
 
institutional investors.  Bank of America received cash for the bonds, 
which it could then relend, and the original mortgage payments passed 
through to the holders of the bonds.  The niche did not really take off 
until the fall of 1981, when Congress passed a tax break that gave thrifts 
an incentive to sell their mortgage loans.  The only fully staffed 
mortgage bond trading desk on Wall Street at that time, Salomon 
Brothers, became a hugely profitable enterprise, and a new market 
emerged. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See American History & Mortgage Lending Deregulation, INVESTORVILLAGE, Feb. 
23, 2008, http://investorvillage.com/ajaxmsg.asp?mid=A0D54DDD22E22ED3&print=1  
(mapping the history of mortgage lending, securitization, and deregulation). 
 80. See generally U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADMINISTRATOR OF NATIONAL 
BANKS, ASSET SECURITIZATION CONTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 3-4 (1997), 
http://www.dallasfed.org/news/ca/2005/05wallstreet_assets.pdf (discussing the emergence 
and growth of securitization markets). 
 81. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 141, 511, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 163). 
 82. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 312, 111 Stat. 788 (repealing 
I.R.C. § 1034 and amending § 121 to limit gain recognition to over $250,000 for single 
filers and over $500,000 for joint filers). 
 83. See Cathy Lesser Mansfied, The Road to Subprime ‘HEL’ Was Paved with Good 
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 
S.C. L. REV. 473, 522 (2000) (tracing the staggering increase in home equity loans in the 
1980s). 
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home mortgage loans.84  In the beginning, the Act accommodated higher 
conventional mortgage rates in states with low usury laws.85  Later, it 
provided more flexibility for developing non-conventional, subprime 
mortgage loans, which carry higher fees, costs, and interest rates.86  The 
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 preempted state laws 
that restricted banks from making any mortgage except conventional fixed-
rate amortizing mortgages.87  This led to various exotic new mortgages, 
including adjustable rate mortgages, balloon payment mortgages, and 
interest-only mortgages.88  The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement 
Act of 1984 “enable[d] private issuers of [MBSs] to compete effectively 
with government-related agencies,”89 including the GSEs, “by removing 
some of the legal impediments to issuing private [MBSs].”90 
The second round of deregulation began in the mid 1990s and put the 
last nails in the regulatory coffin.91  The Financial Services Modernization 
 
 84. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 85. See Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing 
Debt Burdens of Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 167, 175 (2007) (stating that the law permanently overrode state-imposed ceilings on 
mortgage rates unless states reenacted the ceilings within three years). 
 86. See Kenneth C. Johnston, James B. Greer, Julie K. Biermacher & Joseph Hummel, 
The Subprime Morass:  Past, Present, and Future, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 125, 127 (2008) 
(asserting that the DIDMCA fostered the growth of the subprime mortgage market); see also 
Anne Balcer Norton, Reaching the Glass Usury Ceiling: Why State Ceilings and Federal 
Preemption Force Low-Income Borrowers Into Subprime Mortgage Loans, 35 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 215, 216 (2005) (“Congress’s enactment of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act . . . promulgated the growth of . . . subprime lending.”). 
 87. Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-06 (2006). 
 88. See Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Alternative_Mortgage_Transaction_Parity_Act_of_1982 (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2009) (explaining the emergence of these new types of loans under the 
AMTPA, which permitted loan terms that obscured the actual total cost of the loan). 
 89. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization:  Evolution, Current 
Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1385 (1991). 
 90. Id. at 1385-86  
As finally adopted, [the Act] (1) preempts certain state legal investment 
laws so as to permit state-regulated institutions to invest in ’mortgage 
related securities,’ as defined in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the ‘1934 Act’); (2) permits national banks, federal credit unions, and 
federal savings and loan associations to invest in privately issued 
mortgage-related securities; (3) preempts state blue sky laws so as to 
exempt such securities from registration under state securities laws to 
the same extent that securities issued or guaranteed by a government-
related agency are exempt; and (4) amends the margin requirements of 
the 1934 Act to permit delayed delivery of such securities and thereby 
allow a forward trading market to develop. 
 91. See Robert Scheer, McCain and the Mortgage Meltdown, THENATION.COM, Sept. 
10, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc 
/20080922/scheer  (quoting then-Presidential candidate Senator John McCain about recent 
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Act of 1999 partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 and 
effectively opened up competition among commercial and investment 
banks, securities and insurance companies.92  Among other things, the Act 
allowed commercial banks to expand into other financial activities, such as 
operating an investment division or joining forces with an investment bank 
to securitize and sell MBSs.93  The Commodities Future Modernization Act 
of 2000 deregulated the market for credit-default swaps,94 which “are 
essentially insurance policies covering the losses on securities in the event 
of a default.”95  Underestimating the impact of this small change,96 the 
deregulation of credit-default swaps encouraged investment in subprime 
MBSs and the purchase of insurance to secure against potential MBS 
losses.97 
In addition to its deregulation efforts, the federal government also 
actively promoted the origination, purchasing, selling, and guaranteeing of 
increasingly riskier MBSs.  For example, beginning in the mid-1990s, the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) increased 
affordable housing goals for the GSEs in an effort to increase 
homeownership among historically disadvantaged groups.98  In 1995, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began receiving affordable housing credits 
from HUD for purchasing MBSs comprised primarily of mortgages made 
to low-income, historically disadvantaged borrowers.99  In July 1999, HUD 
 
legislation that “ended significant regulation of the financial community”). 
 92. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L. 
106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338. 
 93. See Griffin, supra note 66 (attributing the mortgage crisis in part to bank 
deregulations, including the 1999 Financial Services Modernization Act); Landler & 
Stolberg, supra note 42 (pointing to the Act as the most significant recent bank 
deregulation); Kammer, supra note 43 (tracing the trend of bank deregulation from the early 
1980s). 
 94. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 
Stat. 2763 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 95. David Corn, Foreclosure Phil, MOTHERJONES, May 28, 2008, 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2008/07/foreclosure-phil.html. 
 96. See Moran, supra note 11, at 42 (explaining that Congress’ decision to exempt 
credit-default swaps from federal regulation was based on a “consensus . . . that the market 
was still very small and no systemic risk would exist since investors’ inclinations to 
minimize their risks would protect the broader financial system.”). 
 97. Id.; see also Griffin, supra note 66 (stating that companies suffered billions in 
losses through their trading and guaranteeing of MBSs). 
 98. See Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending: 
Minority Home Ownership May Increase, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at C2 (announcing 
that Fannie Mae eased its lending requirements in a move to increase mortgage 
opportunities for low-income consumers); see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, 
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 
2095 (2007) (discussing predatory loans). 
 99. See Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, 
June 10, 2008, at A1, (criticizing HUD for encouraging risky lending by requiring Fannie 
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proposed that fifty percent of GSE loan activity originate from low and 
moderate-income borrowers.100  In 2005, HUD again ratcheted up Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac’s affordable housing goals for the next four years, 
from fifty percent to fifty-six percent.101  Due in part to the increased goals 
and financial incentives, from 2004 through 2006, the GSEs purchased 
$434 billion in MBSs containing large percentages of subprime 
mortgages.102 
Finally, in 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
made what observers believe to be the single biggest regulatory mistake 
leading to the financial crisis.103  The SEC exempted the then five largest 
investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear 
Stearns, and Morgan Stanley) from leverage constraints and certain 
valuation rules.104  As an example of the exemption’s impact, when Bear 
Stearns collapsed in March 2008, after buying massive amounts of MBSs 
and other collateral debt obligations, it had a debt-to-asset ratio of 33-to-
1.105  Other exempted firms had similar debt-to-asset ratio increases.106 
Financial industry creativity, a virtually nonexistent federal regulatory 
structure, eviscerated state control, federal government encouragement, 
pre-2006 record low interest rates, and record high home values caused 
commercial banks to increase volume in prime and subprime mortgage 
origination.107  Further, mortgage lenders joined commercial banks and 
investment banks as a new cottage industry that spurred on the prime and 
subprime mortgage markets.108 The financial industry packaged 
increasingly risky loans as MBSs.  A handful of conflicted credit rating 
 
Mae and Freddie Mac to significantly increase their investment in subprime loans). 
 100. Holmes, supra note 98. 
 101. HUD Housing Goals, 24 C.F.R. § 81.12 (2004). 
 102. Republican Caucus, Comm. on the Budget, Roots of the Financial Crisis:  The Role 
of Government Policy 6 (Jan. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.house.gov/budget_republicans/press/2007/pr20090108rootcauses.pdf (“From 
2004 through 2006, the two GSEs purchased $434 billion in securities backed by subprime 
loans.  In 2004 alone, the Fannie and Freddie purchased $175 billion in subprime mortgage 
securities, which accounted for 44 percent of the market that year.”). 
 103. See Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-up of Broker-Dealers, 
N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, at B1 (blaming the SEC for causing the meltdown of major 
broker-dealers by relaxing regulation); see also Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let 
Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (discussing the SEC’s 
deregulation of brokerage units’ debt and its effects). 
 104. See Satow, supra note 103 (discussing these exemptions). 
 105. Griffin, supra note 66. 
 106. See Labaton, supra note 103 (discussing the effects of the exemptions granted to the 
five major brokerage firms). 
 107. See Carrillo, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the various new mortgage types that 
fueled the steep increase in home ownership). 
 108. See Dennis Hevesi, Giving Credit Where Credit was Denied, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 
1997, at Real Estate 1 (discussing the emergence and explosion of the subprime market). 
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agencies gave the MBSs AAA-investment grade ratings.  Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, individuals, and investment bankers subsequently bought the 
MBSs.109 
With all the players in place, the subprime mortgage market spree hit 
its zenith at the height of the U.S. housing boom.  From 2003 to 2007, U.S. 
subprime mortgages increased 292 percent, from $332 billion to $1.3 
trillion, and most of that activity was due to the private sector’s entrance 
into the subprime secondary market.110  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
however, held their own and aggressively developed a primary and 
secondary mortgage market that, in part, targeted subprime borrowers.111  
Along the way, every loan origination or sale generated fees for the 
respective players and bonuses were given for volume sales.  As the loans 
or MBSs became riskier, fees and bonuses went higher. 
In conclusion, the financial industry’s reliance on short-term 
productivity benchmarks and greed played a role in the financial crisis.  
But, it was primarily the federal government’s abdication of its role in 
regulating the financial industry and its adoption of increasingly risky 
homeownership goals for the GSEs and other federal agencies and 
programs that created an environment of corporate reckless 
abandonment.112  In this case, the federal government “chicken” came 
before the multi-million dollar payout “egg.” 
 
III. THE COST OF AGGRESSIVE HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICIES, 
DEREGULATION & CORPORATE GREED:  BAILING OUT THE 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY 
 
The mortgage market began unraveling at the end of 2007.  In July 
2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shares traded above $60.113  By mid-
 
 109. See Unterman, supra note 55, at 84 (detailing the types of loans included in MBSs 
and pointing out that these loans shifted risk from the mortgage originator to the lender). 
 110. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, A SNAPSHOT OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET, at 1 
(2007), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/snapshot-of-
the-subprime-market.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 111. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 98, at C2 (discussing an easing of credit requirements 
by Fannie Mae and the potential pitfalls associated with the change); Leonning, supra note 
99, at A1 (describing policies implemented by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac which targeted 
the subprime loan market and the implications of those changes); REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, 
supra note 102, at 4-8 (discussing the effects of creating a market for subprime loans as 
result of the purchasing of securitized subprime loans by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 112. See REPUBLICAN CAUCUS, COMM. ON BUDGET, supra note 102, at 1-13 (discussing 
the role of the federal government in the housing crisis). 
 113. MARK JICKLING, CRS REPORT FOR CONG., FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC IN 
CONSERVATORSHIP, at CRS-2, n.2, (2008), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf. 
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July 2008, the GSEs’ share value had fallen by sixty percent or more,114 
with the GSEs reporting over $12 billion in losses by September 2008.115  
By July 2008, major financial institutions reported initial losses of 
approximately $435 billion (primarily based on subprime-laden MBSs).116 
The multi-billion dollar corporate losses led to a long and 
distinguished list of financial industry failures.  On the brink of bankruptcy, 
Bear Stearns’ share value declined from $20 billion in January 2007 to 
about $3.5 billion in March 2008.  To avoid Bear Stearns’ bankruptcy, in 
March 2008, the Federal Reserve brokered a deal between JP Morgan 
Chase and Bear Stearns where the former bought out the latter for a mere 
$2 a share (approximately $236 million).117  Indymac Bank, a subsidiary of 
Independent National Mortgage Corporation (“Indymac”), was placed into 
receivership in July 2008.  Indymac’s failure was the fourth largest bank 
failure in U.S. history, and the second largest failure of a regulated thrift.118  
In September 2008, banking regulators facilitated the sale of Washington 
Mutual Inc., which as of that date was the largest savings bank and biggest 
U.S. bank failure.119  Also in September 2008, 150-year-old Lehman 
Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.120  This series of events was only 
the beginning of the end for many financial institutions.121 
 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, Treasury Chief Paulson Unveils 
Historic Government Takeover of Twin Mortgage Buyers, Top Executives Are Out, CNN 
MONEY, Sept. 7, 2008, 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/index.htm. 
 116. Josh Fineman & Bradley Keoun, Merrill Lynch Posts Fourth Straight Quarterly 
Loss, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=atGti_UmcPnM&refer=home 
(last updated July 17, 2008). 
 117. Robin Sidel, Dennis K. Berman & Kate Kelly, J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, 
As Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2008, at A1; see also Joseph 
Giannone & Dane Hamilton, Fed Comes to Bear Stearns’ Rescue; Shares Dive, REUTERS, 
Mar. 14, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN1438968020080314?feedType=RSS&f
eedName=businessNews (discussing the financing of the Bear Sterns’ acquisition). 
 118. FACTBOX: Top Ten U.S. Bank Failures, REUTERS, Sept. 25, 2008,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/idUSTRE48P0YC20080926. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Michael Liedtke, Grown Over 150 Years, Lehman End Came Swiftly, INT’L BUS. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080915/grown-over-150-years-
lehman-end-came-swiftly_all.htm (discussing the descent of Lehman Brothers into 
bankruptcy). 
 121. See Subprime Crisis Impact Timeline, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subprime_crisis_impact_timeline (last visited Oct. 5 2009) 
(listing dates and descriptions of major events of the subprime crisis); see also The 
Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, http://ml-implode.com/ (listing the then 363 major U.S. 
lending operations that have imploded since late 2006) (last visited Oct 5, 2009). 
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A. Initial Federal Intervention 
 
Prior to EESA and ARRA’s enactment, Congress and the Bush 
administration adopted a piecemeal federal relief strategy, which allowed 
some financial institutions to fail and saved only those industry players that 
were deemed critical to financial recovery.  The government decided the 
GSEs and AIG were critical and thus saved them from bankruptcy filings 
or certain corporate ruin. 
Congress and the Bush administration determined that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were too big to fail.  After all, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac owned or guaranteed about half of the $12 trillion mortgage market.122  
Further, investors worldwide owned $5.2 trillion of debt securities backed 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.123  The Chinese government alone owned 
hundreds of billions of dollars worth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
bonds.124 
To save the GSEs, in July 2008, President Bush signed into law the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act.125  The Act created a new GSE 
regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), and placed the 
GSEs under the FHFA’s regulatory authority.  The Act also gave the 
Treasury the authority to advance up to $200 billion to stabilize Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.126 
In September 2008, the federal government stepped in again and 
essentially nationalized the GSEs.127  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
placed in a government-operated conservatorship, with the FHFA as the 
conservator,128 having “veto power over all major [GSE] decisions, 
including [decisions regarding the] hiring and firing of executives, 
 
 122. See Ellis, supra note 115 (“All told, [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] own or back 
$5.4 trillion worth of home debt - half the mortgage debt in the country.”). 
 123. Charles Duhigg, A Trickle That Turned into a Torrent, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, 
at C1 (discussing the turmoil at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 124. Maureen Thacik, 5 Dumb Fannie Mae Bailout Assertions That Are Actually Secretly 
Smart, GAWKER, Sept. 8, 2008, http://gawker.com/5047007/5-dumb-fannie-mae-bailout-
assertions-that-are-actually-secretly-smart. 
 125. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654. 
 126. Id. at tit. I, § 1117, 122 Stat. at 2683. 
 127. See Kathleen M. Howley, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae Bailout Lowers Mortgage 
Rates, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 8, 2008,  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aFL16l3QSSIY&refer=home 
(discussing the bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); cf. Jickling, supra note 113, at 
CRS-3, 4 (“Common shareholders have lost their voting rights and nearly all their 
investment, and dividends on preferred and common shares have been suspended.  On the 
other hand, the government action benefits the holders of debt issued or guaranteed by the 
GSEs, who receive ‘security and clarity’ that the ‘conserved entities have the ability to 
fulfill their financial obligations.’”). 
 128. Howley, supra note 127. 
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[executive] compensation and pricing.”129 
Of course, the FHFA’s conservatorship could not turn back years of 
the GSEs’ guarantees on, and ownership and securitization of, increasingly 
riskier MBSs.  In 2008, Fannie Mae reported a $58.7 billion loss,130 and a 
first quarter 2009 loss of $23.2 billion.131  For 2008, Freddie Mac reported 
over $50 billion in losses,132 and a first quarter 2009 loss of $9.9 billion.133  
By March 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had already received $60 
billion in federal funds.134  In May 2009, Fannie Mae indicated that it 
required “$19 billion in additional government aid as job losses grew and 
risky loans made in the housing boom went bad at an unnerving pace.”135  
Also in May 2009, Freddie Mac requested an additional $6.1 billion in 
aid.136  The Obama administration indicated that federal aid to the two 
GSEs may exceed $147 billion by September 2010.137 
As the largest insurance company in the United States,138 AIG’s 
continuing viability was also deemed critical to national and global 
interests.  AIG got into trouble by spreading out into trading and 
guaranteeing MBSs through its subsidiary, AIG Financial Products (“AIG 
FP”).  AIG FP held and marketed MBSs, and under credit-default swaps, 
insured against losses on those and other types of collateral debt 
obligations, making it vulnerable on two fronts.139  AIG FP built up a 
 
 129. James R. Hagerty, Fannie Insider Gets CEO Job, But no Raise, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
21, 2009 at A6; Press Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Fact Sheet:  Questions and 
Answers on Conservatorship (Sept. 3, 2008), at 3,  
http://www.treas.gov//press/releases/reports/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128.pdf. 
 130. News Release, Fannie Mae Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2008 Results 
(Feb. 26, 2009),  
http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/form10k_newsrelease_022609.pdf. 
 131. News Release, Fannie Mae Reports First-Quarter 2009 Results (May 8, 2009), 
http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/q12009_release.pdf. 
 132. News Release, Freddie Mac Reports Fourth Quarter and Full-Year 2008 Financial 
Results (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/investors/2009/2008er-
4q08.html. 
 133. News Release, Freddie Mac Releases First Quarter 2009 Financial Results (May 
12, 2009), http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/investors/2009/2009er-1q09.html. 
 134. Associated Press, Fannie Mae Says It Needs $19 Billion More in Aid, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 9, 2009, at B4. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Tami Luhby, Freddie Mac Needs Another $6.1 B in Aid, Total Bailout Comes to 
$51.7 Billion as Mortgage Financier Reports a $9.9 Billion Quarterly Loss, CNN MONEY, 
May 12, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/12/news/companies/Freddie_results/index.htm?postversion=
2009051218. 
 137. Associated Press, supra note 134. 
 138. See Bill Saporito, How AIG Became Too Big to Fall, TIME, Mar. 30, 2009, at 24 
(discussing the aftermath of the AIG bailout and its effects). 
 139. Id. 
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portfolio of $2.7 trillion in derivatives, including substantial MBSs.140  
Then, in 2008, when all the MBS chips came crumbling down, AIG’s $6.9 
billion in insurance earnings was unable to absorb its losses, including AIG 
FP’s initial $40.4 billion in losses.141 
After Moody’s and S&P’s September 2008 downgrade of AIG’s credit 
rating,142 the Federal Reserve lent $85 billion to the financial conglomerate 
to forestall its potential bankruptcy filing.143  This was only the beginning 
of AIG “loans,” which, as of May 2009, led to U.S. taxpayers owning an 
eighty percent equity stake in the company.144 
 
B. EESA & ARRA Come to The Rescue 
 
Realizing that piecemeal bailouts would not rescue a systemically 
failing financial industry,145 EESA was signed into law on October 3, 
2008.146  A newly created Treasury agency, the Office of Financial 
Stability, is responsible for running TARP in consultation with the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”), the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Secretary of HUD.147  EESA provides 
that the TARP bailout period generally terminates on December 31, 2009, 
but can be extended to October 3, 2010 (meaning two years of government 
funding, intervention, and oversight of the financial industry).148 
Initially, TARP was designed to purchase toxic assets, predominantly 
MBSs, from financial institutions.149  The original intent, however, faced a 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Tony Monroe, AIG in Focus as Financial Meltdown Spreads, REUTERS, Sept. 
16, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN1551938520080916 (discussing 
the effects of AIG’s ratings downgrade). 
 143. Griffin, supra note 66. 
 144. See James Pethokoukis, New York Fed Selects Trustees for AIG Stake, REUTERS, 
Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE50F7L220090116 
(discussing the New York Federal Reserve’s appointment of trustees to oversee the U.S. 
Government’s stake in AIG); see also Sean Lengell, Geithner Says AIG Bailout 
‘Complicated’, WASH. TIMES (DC), May 21, 2009, at A11 (discussing the details of the AIG 
bailout) and Liam Pleven, Matthew Karnitschnig & Deborah Solomon, U.S. Revamps 
Bailout of AIG, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2009, at A1 (same). 
 145. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Legislative History, 
WIKIPEDIA.ORG, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergency_Economic_Stabilization_Act_of_2008 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2009) (discussing EESA). 
 146. EESA, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 147. Id. at div. A, tit. I, § 104(b), 122 Stat. 3771. 
 148. Id. at div. A, tit. I, § 120, 122 Stat. 3788. 
 149. See Rick Newman, How TARP Began: An Exclusive Inside View, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., May 14, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/flowchart/2009/05/14/how-tarp-
MCCLENDONFINAL_FIVE 1/22/2010  5:13:35 PM 
152 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
stark reality.  There was no way to place a fair market value on these assets, 
and there were no buyers other than the federal government.150  The 
Treasury’s approach quickly morphed into establishing programs under 
which financial institutions and companies in failing industries (e.g., the 
automotive industry) would receive a capital infusion in exchange for the 
federal government’s receipt of preferred equity interests, plus a stated rate 
of return on the investments.151 
Originally, there were five programs established under TARP:  the 
Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”); the Systematically Significant Failing 
Institutions Program (“SSFIP”), the Targeted Investment Program (“TIP”), 
the Automotive Industry Financing Program, and the Term Asset-Backed 
Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”).  Four of the original five provided 
direct relief to the financial industry.152  The CPP was the largest program.  
 
began-an-exclusive-inside-view.html (discussing the origins of the TARP). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (quoting David Nason, a senior Treasury Dep’t official during the Bush 
administration:  “The reason the TARP morphed from asset purchases to injecting capital is 
really quite practical.  Asset purchases were taking longer than we had hoped, and it was 
more complicated with the vendors.  Also, we needed to be in lockstep with our brethren 
around the world.  The U.K., France, and Germany were prepared to guarantee the liabilities 
of the banking sector and were going to deploy capital into their banks.”); see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial 
Rescue Package and Economic Update (Nov. 12, 2008),  
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1265.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2009): 
As credit markets froze in mid-September, the Administration asked 
Congress for broad tools and flexibility to rescue the financial system.  
We asked for $700 billion to purchase troubled assets from financial 
institutions.  At the time, we believed that would be the most effective 
means of getting credit flowing again.  During the two weeks that 
Congress considered the legislation, market conditions worsened 
considerably.  It was clear to me by the time the bill was signed on 
October 3rd that we needed to act quickly and forcefully, and that 
purchasing troubled assets – our initial focus – would take time to 
implement and would not be sufficient given the severity of the 
problem.  In consultation with the Federal Reserve, I determined that the 
most timely, effective step to improve credit market conditions was to 
strengthen bank balance sheets quickly through direct purchases of 
equity in banks. 
 152. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE 
QUARTER ENDING JUNE 30, 2009 SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 104(G) OF THE 
EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 (2009), at 36, available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/FSOB/FINSOB-Qrtly-Rpt-063009.pdf [hereinafter 
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009] (detailing the 
Oversight Board’s second quarter review of TARP).  The financial industry also received 
indirect relief under the Automotive Industry Financing Program. As of May 8, 2009, the 
Treasury had released over $24.7 billion in total loans under this program, including loans to 
GMAC and Chrysler Financial.  See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT TO 
CONGRESS FOR THE QUARTER ENDING MAR. 31, 2009 SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 
104(G) OF THE EMERGENCY STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 (2009), at 51, available at 
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It was designed to “invest up to $250 billion in U.S. banks that are healthy, 
but desire an extra layer of capital for stability or lending.”153  According to 
the Financial Stability Oversight Board’s second quarter of 2009 report to 
Congress, as of June 30, 2009, the “Treasury had invested approximately 
$203 billion under the CPP in senior preferred shares or other senior 
securities of 649 financial institutions, in 48 states . . . .”154 
The SSFIP was short-lived and essentially used only to provide further 
bailout funds to AIG.155  Under the program, the Treasury initially invested 
$40 billion in AIG in exchange for AIG senior preferred shares and 
warrants to purchase common stock.156  As part of the agreement, AIG’s 
outstanding debt to the Federal Reserve was restructured.157  By March 31, 
2009, AIG had received over $170 billion in federal funds, including 
additional TARP funds.158 
The TIP was designed to “stabilize the financial system by making 
investments in institutions that are critical to the functioning of the 
financial system,” regardless of whether the institution is deemed healthy 
(as required under the CPP).159  The program was not designed to be widely 
 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/FSOB/FINSOB-Qrtly-Rpt-033109.pdf [hereinafter 
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009] (“[O]n January 
16, 2009, Treasury made a $1.5 billion loan to a special purpose entity created by Chrysler 
Financial to finance the extension of new consumer auto loans . . . .”). 
 153. U.S DEP’T OF TREAS., Road to Stability, Capital Purchase Program, 
FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV, 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/capitalpurchaseprogram.html (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2009). 
 154. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152, at 30. 
 155. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Treasury Announces New Policy To Increase 
Transparency in Financial Stability Program (Jan. 28, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg04.html; see also FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. 
QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009, supra note 152, at 9 (discussing the general 
application of programs such as the SSFIP to entities such as AIG); FIN. STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, supra note 152, at 48 
(showing that no further action was taken under programs such as the SSFIP). 
 156. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Treasury to Invest in AIG Restructuring 
Under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (Nov. 10, 2008),  
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/hp1261.html (detailing the purchase of senior 
preferred stock from AIG). 
 157. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD. QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152, at 50. 
 158. See Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Banks It Paid With U.S. Bailout Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1, A14 (“Ever since the insurer’s rescue began, with the Fed’s 
$85 billion emergency loan last fall, there have been demands for a full public accounting of 
how the money was used.  The taxpayer assistance has now grown to $170 billion, and the 
government owns nearly 80 percent of the company.”). 
 159. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., ROAD TO STABILITY, TARGETED INVESTMENT PROGRAM 
(UPDATED SEPT. 9, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/targetedinvestmentprogram.html (last 
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used, and as of March 31, 2009, only Bank of America and Citigroup had 
received TIP funds.  The funds released to these institutions were, however, 
substantial.  For example, Bank of America and Citigroup each qualified 
for billions of dollars in additional funding under this program.160 
The last of the original programs targeting the financial industry, the 
TALF, is a joint program sponsored by the Treasury and the New York 
Federal Reserve.  It was designed to support “securitization markets for key 
types of consumer and small business credit and, thereby, assist in making 
[] credit more available and affordable.”161  Its original focus was on newly 
or recently-originated AAA-rated asset-backed securities supported by 
student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, and loans guaranteed by the 
Small Business Administration.162  More than $8 billion was distributed 
under the program during the first quarter of 2009,163 and almost $24 billion 
was distributed during the second quarter of 2009.164 
In 2009, the Treasury implemented two additional programs that 
provided capital to financial institutions:  the Capital Assistance Program 
(“CAP”); and the Public-Private Investment Program (“PPIP”).  In 
February 2009, the Treasury announced the terms and conditions of CAP, 
which is described as “a core element of the [Obama] Administration’s 
Financial Stability Plan.”165  The purpose of the program “is to restore 
confidence throughout the financial system that the nation’s largest banking 
institutions have a sufficient capital cushion against larger than expected 
future losses, should they occur due to a more severe economic 
environment, and to support lending to creditworthy borrowers.”166  CAP 
has two components:  mandatory assessment or stress testing for the 
nineteen largest bank holding companies, and potential additional funding 
through the purchase of equity interests for eligible financial institutions.167 
 
visited Oct. 9, 2009) (identifying broader eligibility considerations for TIP participants). 
 160. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009, 
supra note 152, at 44-47 (discussing Treasury’s actions regarding Bank of America, 
Citigroup, and AIG). 
 161. Id. at 26. 
 162. Id. at 27. 
 163. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152, at 28 (documenting the issuance of $8.3 billion of credit card and asset-back 
securities). 
 164. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152, at 36 (“$23.9 billion in TALF loans extended during the quarterly period...”). 
 165. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., ROAD TO STABILITY, CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/ capitalassistance.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2009). 
 166. Id. 
 167. White Paper, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., The Capital Assistance Program and Its Role in 
the Financial Stability Plan (Feb. 25, 2009), at 2, 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf. 
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In March 2009, the Treasury announced details of PPIP.168  The 
program is a joint program sponsored by the Treasury, FDIC, and Federal 
Reserve, and includes a securities purchase program designed to remedy 
the illiquidity in the secondary markets for certain MBSs, and a loan 
purchase program designed to create a market for troubled loans on bank 
and thrift balance sheets.169  The Financial Stability Oversight Board 
outlined details of the program in its second quarter 2009 report, including 
criteria for two sub-programs entitled the Legacy Securities Program and 
the Legacy Loans Program, with $75 to $100 billion in TARP funds 
available but yet to be distributed under the programs.170 
Together, the aforementioned TARP programs were designed to 
recapitalize the financial industry, increase business and consumer lending, 
and deal with toxic MBSs remaining on institutions’ balance sheets.  Under 
various programs, by the end of June 2009, the top nine bailout recipients 
received a massive influx of capital:  Bank of America received $45 
billion; Bank of New York Mellon $3 billion; Citigroup, Inc. $45 billion; 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. $10 billion; JP Morgan Chase $25 billion; 
Merrill Lynch $10 billion (diverted to Bank of America with its acquisition 
of the former); Morgan Stanley $10 billion; State Street $2 billion; and 
Wells Fargo $25 billion.171  Billions more were distributed to smaller 
institutions. 
Going into the fall 2009, the success or failure of the TARP bailouts 
cannot be determined.  According to Neil Barofsky, the special inspector 
general for the TARP program, a year into the program, “there is little 
question that the dramatic steps taken by Treasury, the Federal Reserve and 
the FDIC through TARP and related programs . . . played a significant role 
in bringing the system back from the brink of collapse.”172  However, 
 
 168. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Treasury Department Releases Details on 
Public Private Partnership Investment Program (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg65.html. 
 169. Id. 
 170. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152, at 44. 
 171. Andrew M. Cuomo, Atty. Gen. State of NY, No Rhyme or Reason:  The ‘Heads I 
Win, Tails You Lose’ Bank Bonus Culture, July 30, 2009, at 6, available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/july/pdfs/Bonus%20Report%20Final%207.3
0.09.pdf [hereinafter Cuomo Report]. 
 172. Opinion, Commentary: TARP, One Year Later, MORNING SUN, Oct. 7, 2009, 
http://www.themorningsun.com/articles/2009/10/07/opinion/srv0000006573114.prt (quoting 
Barofsky’s testimony before the Senate Banking Committee); see also Brian Wingfield, 
Birthday for a Bailout, FORBES.COM, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/01/tarp-
anniversary-bailout-business-washington-tarp.html (“Despite signs of recovery, the 
economy is by no means on stable footing.  The FDIC now thinks U.S. bank failures will 
balloon to $100 billion in losses through 2013, rather than the previous estimate of $70 
billion.”). 
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without dealing with questionable MBSs remaining on their balance sheets, 
larger financial institutions reported record 2009 quarterly profits from new 
lending activities, while other, predominantly smaller, institutions were 
collapsing under the weight of their MBS holdings.173 
In its quarterly report for the quarter ending June 30, 2009, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Board addressed the complexities of 
evaluating EESA programs, including reduced demand for credit due to 
weaker economic activity, reduced supply of credit because of the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, restrained lending in anticipation of future 
losses, and the impact of TARP repayments.174  Only time will tell whether 
the trillions of dollars in capital infusions (under TARP and other federal 
programs and initiatives) will revitalize our financial industry and 
strengthen the economy, or whether the federal government continued 
throwing good money after bad with no resulting long-term economic 
growth and sustainability. 
 
 
IV.  EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXCESSES & THE FINANCIAL 
INDUSTRY’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FAILURE:  ENACTED AND 
PROPOSED REFORMS & THEIR LIMITATIONS 
 
A. EESA, ARRA, Obama Administration Proposals & Congressional 
Legislation Aimed at Curbing Perceived Greed & Misdeed 
 
EESA served as the launching point for imposing temporary executive 
compensation and corporate governance restrictions on certain TARP 
recipients by focusing in on the roles of executive compensation and 
corporate governance in the financial crisis.  EESA amends Internal 
Revenue Code (“Code”) Sections 162(m) and 280G to limit the 
deductibility of compensation paid to certain executive officers employed 
by financial institutions that sell assets under TARP.175  EESA also subjects 
certain financial institutions to executive compensation and corporate 
governance restrictions.176 
 
 173. Commentary: TARP, One Year Later, supra note 172.  (quoting Barofsky:  “[T]he 
so-called ‘toxic’ assets that helped cause this crisis for the most part remain right where they 
were [in the fall 2008] – on the banks’ balance sheets; and it is becoming more and more 
clear that the commercial real estate market might be the next proverbial shoe to drop, 
threatening to increase the pressure on banks and small businesses alike yet again.”); Pat 
Garofalo, Geithner: TARP Repayment Means Toxic Asset Plan May Fizzle, THE WONK 
ROOM, (June 2, 2009), http://wonkroom.thinkprogress.org/2009/06/02/geithner-ppip-fizzle/. 
 174. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, supra 
note 152. 
 175. EESA, div. A, tit. III, § 302, 122 Stat. 3803-06. 
 176. Id. at div. A, tit. I, § 111, 122 Stat. 3776-77. 
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Code Section 162(m) generally restricts the deductibility of non-
performance-based compensation for certain top corporate executives of 
publicly-traded corporations.177  The compensation deduction for the CEO, 
as well as the next four most highly-compensated employees, is limited to 
$1 million per year unless compensation payments above that benchmark 
are performance-based and meet additional statutory requirements 
(including shareholder approval and compensation committee 
independence requirements).178  Code Section 280G generally limits the 
deductibility of corporate executives’ excess parachute payments and 
imposes a twenty percent excise tax on executives for the excess amount.179  
An “excess parachute payment,” often referred to as a golden parachute 
payment, is defined as a payment made to certain individuals due to a 
change of control or ownership and exceeds three times their average 
annual compensation for the five years predating the event invoking the 
payment.180 
EESA’s two Code amendments temporarily reduce certain TARP 
recipients’ deductions for executive compensation and expand the reach of 
the excess parachute payments restriction.181  The EESA addition to 162(m) 
“generally reduces the $1 million deduction to $500,000 for [the TARP 
period] and provides that certain original exceptions to the deduction 
limitation, including the exception for performance-based compensation, 
are not applicable.”182  The reduction applies to public and private financial 
institutions that have sold more than $300 million in total assets to the 
Treasury under TARP (the nine largest TARP recipients noted earlier, as 
well as other financial institutions).183  Affected employees include the 
financial institution’s CEO, chief financial officer (“CFO”), and the three 
next highest-compensated officers.  EESA’s $500,000 limit is not 
retroactive; in other words, it does not apply to compensation due under 
pre-existing employment contracts.  Code Section 280G(e), as added by 
EESA, generally retains the deductibility limitations for excess parachute 
payments but expands the trigger points to bankruptcy, liquidation, 
involuntary terminations of covered executives, or receivership of the 
employer corporation.184 
 
 177. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2009). 
 178. Id.; see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-27 (2004). 
 179. I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999. 
 180. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2). 
 181. EESA, div. A, tit. III, § 302, 122 Stat. 3803-06. 
 182. I.R.S. Notice 2008-94, 2008-44 I.R.B. 1070. 
 183. I.R.C. § 162(m) normally applies to only publicly-traded companies.  EESA 
temporarily expands its reach to private financial institutions. 
 184. See Treas. Notice 2008-TAAP, Oct. 14, 2008, 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/2008101495019994.htm; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREAS., The Latest, http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
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EESA also employs the following executive compensation and 
corporate governance restrictions on TARP recipients during the period in 
which the Treasury holds an equity or debt position in the financial 
institution:  (1) Limits on compensation that exclude incentives to SEOs to 
take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the financial 
institution;185 (2) recovery of any bonus or incentive compensation paid to 
SEOs based on statements of earnings, gains, or other criteria that are later 
proven to be materially inaccurate (the “clawback”);186 (3) a prohibition on 
making excess parachute payments to any SEO;187 and (4) in the case of a 
financial institution that has sold to the Treasury more than $300 million in 
equity or debt, a prohibition from entering into any new employment 
contract with an SEO providing any exit compensation in the event of 
involuntary termination from employment, bankruptcy filing, insolvency, 
or receivership.188 
The Treasury first addressed EESA’s executive compensation and 
corporate governance restrictions in Treasury Notice 2008-PSSFI, 
published on October 14, 2008, and applicable to TARP recipients 
participating in the SSFIP (essentially AIG).189  Under that guidance, the 
Treasury formulated the following rules to disincentivize unnecessary risk 
taking: 
(1) promptly, and in no case more than 90 days, after the 
purchase under the program, the financial institution’s 
compensation committee, or a committee acting in a similar 
capacity, must review the SEO190 incentive compensation 
arrangements with such financial institution’s senior risk officers 
. . . to ensure that the SEO incentive compensation arrangements 
do not encourage SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive risks 
that threaten the value of the financial institution; (2) thereafter, 
 
latest/tg04.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 185. EESA, div. A, tit. I, § 111(b)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3777. 
 186. Id. div. A, tit. I, § 111(b)(2)(B); see also Interim Final Rule, Tarp Capital Purchase 
Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 62205-01, § 30.6 (Q-6)(Oct. 20, 2008), available at 2008 WL 
4612833 (amended by Interim Final Rule, TARP standards for Compensation and Corporate 
Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28394-01(June 15, 2009) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 30)) (requiring 
participating financial institutions to hold compensation for SEOs during the relevant time 
period subject to “clawback”). 
 187. EESA, § 111(b)(2)(C), 122 Stat. 3777; see also Interim Final Rule, Tarp Capital 
Purchase Program, supra note 186, §§ 30.8, 30.9 (Q-8 and Q-9) (prohibiting participating 
companies from making “golden parachute” payments). 
 188. EESA, § 111(c), 122 Stat. 3777. 
 189. Treas. Notice 2008-PSSFI, at 1 (Oct. 4, 2008), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/exec%20comp%20pssfi%20notice%20revised.p
df. 
 190. “Senior executive officer” means a “named executive officer” as defined in Item 
402 of Regulation S-k under federal securities laws and who meets certain other definitional 
requirements.  See id. at 2. 
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the compensation committee . . . must meet at least annually with 
senior risk officers . . . to discuss and review the relationship 
between the financial institution’s risk management policies and 
practices and the SEO incentive compensation arrangements; and 
(3) the compensation committee . . . must certify that it has 
completed the reviews of the SEO incentive compensation 
arrangements required under (1) and (2) above.191 
 
To meet EESA’s clawback requirement, the Treasury notice requires 
that “SEO bonus and incentive compensation . . . are subject to recovery or 
‘clawback’ by the financial institution if the payments were based on 
materially inaccurate financial statements or any other materially 
inaccurate performance metric criteria[,]” with the italicized language 
being considerably broader than EESA’s statutory requirement (emphasis 
added).192 
Following the Treasury’s initial guidance, both the Treasury and 
Congress instituted additional temporary executive compensation and 
corporate governance restrictions.193  The Treasury was the first to add 
requirements based, in large part, on the financial industry’s perceived 
misuse of TARP funds.  AIG, for example, used part of its bailout funds to 
repay debts owed through financial trades to other banking institutions, 
including $12.9 billion to Goldman Sachs, $11.9 billion to Societe 
Generale, $11.8 billion to Deutsche Bank, $8.5 billion to Barclays, $6.8 
billion to Merrill Lynch, and $5.2 billion to Bank of America.194  These 
payments led some to question whether the AIG bailout was in fact an AIG 
creditor bailout.195  AIG then paid out $165 million in retention bonuses to 
executives at AIG FP, the division that engaged in the MBS transactions 
that brought AIG to the brink of disaster.196  Finally, AIG spent over 
$440,000 for a week-long sales conference at a California resort (a 
relatively insignificant amount that generated significant adverse 
publicity).197 
Reacting to reports that bailout funds were being used incorrectly,198 
 
 191. Id. at 3. 
 192. Id. at 5; see also Interim Final Rule, Tarp Capital Purchase Program, supra note 186 
(providing additional guidance for certain TARP recipients under the CPP consistent with 
the prior guidance issued for financial institutions participating in the SSFIP). 
 193. Sheri Qualters, Companies Seek to Alter Bonuses, Compensation, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 
2, 2009, at 6. 
 194. Saporito, supra note 138. 
 195. Tyler Cowen, Op-Ed., Why Creditors Should Suffer, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2009, 
at B1. 
 196. Saporito, supra note 138. 
 197. Kammer, supra note 43. 
 198. See, e.g., Stevenson Jacobs, Bailed-Out Execs Still Fly Corporate Jets, THE 
HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 21, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/21/bailed-out-
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on February 4, 2009, the Treasury announced additional conditions 
“designed to ensure that public funds are directed only toward the public 
interest in strengthening our economy . . . and not toward inappropriate 
private gain.”199  The heightened restrictions apply differently to financial 
institutions seeking “exceptional assistance” (like AIG and Bank of 
America) versus financial institutions participating in more limited, 
generally available capital access programs.200  The new Treasury 
requirements do not apply retroactively to previously executed TARP 
contracts but instead to any future financing arrangements under TARP.201 
Companies receiving exceptional assistance, like AIG, Bank of 
America and Citigroup, are subject to numerous additional restrictions.  
SEO cash compensation is limited to $500,000, as opposed to simply 
denying tax deductions above the $500,000 amount.202  The only exception 
is for restricted stock awards that cannot vest until government bailout 
funds are repaid in full, plus interest.203  Compensation structure and 
strategy must be fully disclosed and subject to a nonbinding “Say on Pay” 
shareholder resolution.204  The “clawback” is extended from the top five 
SEOs to twenty additional executives “if they are found to have knowingly 
engaged in providing inaccurate information relating to financial 
 
execs-still-fl_n_152727.html (detailing the use of private airplanes by executives of 
companies which had received TARP funds). 
 199. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Treasury Announces New Restrictions on 
Executive Compensation (Feb. 4. 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg15.htm; 
see also John Martini, U.S. Department Of The Treasury Announces Further Executive 
Compensation Restrictions For Financial Institutions Participating In The TARP, MONDAQ, 
Feb. 26, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 3710580 (“According to Treasury and statements 
made by President Obama and Secretary Geithner, these conditions seek to strike a balance 
between ‘the need for strict monitoring and accountability on executive pay’ and the need 
for financial institutions to attract talented executives.”). 
 200. See Press Release, supra note 199  
Generally available programs have the same terms for all recipients, 
with limits on the amount each institution may receive and specified 
returns for taxpayers. The goal of these programs is to help ensure the 
financial system as a whole can provide the credit necessary for 
recovery, including providing capital to smaller community banks that 
play a critical role in lending to small businesses, families and others.  
The previously announced Capital Purchase Program is an example of a 
generally available capital access program.  If a firm needs more 
assistance than is allowed under a widely available standard program, 
then that is exceptional assistance.  Banks falling under the 'exceptional 
assistance' standard have bank-specific negotiated agreements with 
Treasury. Examples include AIG, and the Bank of America and Citi 
transactions under the [TIP]. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
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statements or performance metrics used to calculate their own incentive 
pay” (emphasis added).205  The excess parachute payments restriction is 
expanded from the top five SEOs to the top ten senior officers and limited 
to no greater than one year’s compensation, compared to the previous limit 
of three years’ worth.206  Finally, the board of directors is required to “adopt 
a company-wide policy on any expenditures related to aviation services, 
office and facility renovations, entertainment and holiday parties, and 
conferences and events” (collectively, luxury expenditures).207 
For institutions participating in most generally available capital asset 
programs, there were a few additional requirements—only the extended 
clawback and luxury expenditures provisions noted above are the same.208  
The expanded $500,000 compensation limitation does not apply where the 
company fully discloses its compensation structure and explains how it 
does not encourage excessive and unnecessary risk taking and there is a 
non-binding Say-on-Pay shareholder resolution.209  The ban on excess 
parachute payments is not extended past the top five SEOs but adopts the 
one-year compensation limitation.210 
Not satisfied with the Treasury’s additional requirements,211 Congress 
added executive compensation and corporate governance restrictions in 
ARRA, beefing up EESA and, for the first time, applying some of these 
restrictions retroactively to financial institutions that already received 
TARP funds.212  First, TARP recipients generally may not pay bonuses, 
retention awards and incentive compensation to certain SEOs until 
corporate obligations are satisfied under TARP.213  An exemption exists for 
long-term restricted stock awards that do not exceed in value one-third of 
an employee’s annual compensation (a pittance for SEOs) and do not fully 
vest until the TARP period is concluded.  Another exemption exists for 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Deborah Solomon & Mark Maremont, Bankers Face Strict New Pay Cap, Stimulus 
Bill Puts Retroactive Curb on Bailout Recipients, Wall Street Fumes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 
2009 (“Sen. Dodd said in a statement that 'the decisions of certain Wall Street executives to 
enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers have seriously undermined public confidence 
in efforts to stabilize the economy . . . . With vigorous oversight by the Treasury Department 
and by Congress, these tough new rules will help ensure that taxpayer dollars no longer 
effectively subsidize lavish Wall Street bonuses.'"); see also Joseph E. Bachelder III, How 
Recovery Legislation Amends Executive Pay Limits, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 14, 2009, at 3 
(explaining the effect of the February, 2009 amendments to EESA). 
 212. ARRA, div. B, tit. VII, §7002, 123 Stat. 521 (2009). 
 213. Bachelder, supra note 211. 
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certain pre-existing employment contracts.214 The number of executives per 
company subject to the restriction depends upon the amount of TARP 
assistance received, from only the most highly-paid employee for financial 
institutions that receive less than $25 million in TARP assistance to the 
SEOs and the next twenty most highly-paid employees for those receiving 
$500 million or more.215  Second, ARRA requires the Treasury to review 
bonuses and incentive compensation to SEOs and the next twenty most 
highly-paid employees paid before February 18, 2009 (the effective date of 
ARRA).216  If the Treasury finds that the bonuses were not justified, it is 
empowered to negotiate with TARP recipients and/or executives to obtain 
compensation reimbursements (perhaps publicly shaming them into 
repayments).217  Third, ARRA prohibits excess parachute payments, as 
defined under EESA, to any SEO and the next five most highly- 
compensated employees, regardless of the amount of TARP assistance 
received.218  This provision is much more restrictive than EESA’s original 
restriction.  For example, AARA does not contain a grandfather provision 
to address pre-existing contractual agreements.219  Fourth, ARRA mandates 
that all TARP recipients “permit a separate shareholder vote to approve the 
compensation of executives, as disclosed pursuant to the compensation 
disclosure rules of the [SEC],” during the period in which any obligation 
arising from financial assistance provided under TARP remains 
outstanding.220  Under SEC guidance, the shareholder vote would occur at 
the annual meeting of shareholders for which proxies are solicited.221  Fifth, 
ARRA requires the establishment of a board compensation committee that 
is comprised exclusively of independent directors.222  The Committee must 
meet at least semiannually to evaluate employee compensation plans in 
light of any risk posed to the company.  Finally, similar to a parallel 
 
 214. ARRA, div. B, tit. VII, § 7001, 123 Stat. 516 (2009) (exempting written contracts 
for incentive compensation executed on or before February 11, 2009, subject to the 
authority of the Treasury Secretary to determine the validity of the contract). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.; see also Bachelder, supra note 211. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Thomas W. White, Gail C. Bernstein & David A. Lugis, Economic Stimulus Act 
Establishes New Executive Compensation and Governance Standards for TARP Recipients, 
EMAIL ALERTS (WilmerHale, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 18, 2009, 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=8790. 
 220. ARRA, div. B, tit. VII, § 7001, 116 Stat. 516.  This provision applies to proxy 
statements filed after February 17, 2009, other than definitive proxy statements relating to 
preliminary proxy statements filed on or before February 17, 2009. 
 221. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 
2009 (2009),  http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/arrainterp.htm. 
 222. ARRA, div. B, tit. VII, § 7001 (exempting companies receiving less than $25 
million of TARP funding). 
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requirement under EESA,223 ARRA requires that TARP recipient CEOs 
and CFOs provide written certification of compliance by the company with 
all ARRA requirements.224 
With the legislation set in place, over the next several months, the 
Obama administration and the Treasury took actions to implement EESA 
and ARRA’s requirements and develop a plan to regulate the financial 
industry.  In early June 2009, President Obama appointed Kenneth 
Feinberg as the Special Master in charge of overseeing compensation 
practices for TARP recipients receiving exceptional assistance.225  On June 
15, 2009, the Treasury issued its Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for 
Compensation and Corporate Governance.226  The rule “implements and 
expands upon Title VII of ARRA, which amended the EESA executive 
compensation provisions.”227  In addition to reiterating and implementing 
the standards established under ARRA, the rule outlines the powers and 
responsibilities of Special Master Feinberg as they relate to financial 
institutions that received exceptional assistance:  review of compensation 
payments made to the top five SEOs and the next twenty most highly- 
compensated employees of TARP recipients, review of compensation 
structures for all executive officers and the 100 most highly-compensated 
employees, power to interpret EESA and the Interim Final Rule and the 
review of bonuses paid before ARRA’s effective date, and the power to 
negotiate repayments if payments were contrary to public interests.228 
 
 223. EESA, div. A, tit. I, § 111, 122 Stat 3776-77. 
 224. ARRA, div. B, title VII, § 7001, 116 Stat. 516.  In the case of a TARP recipient 
whose securities are publicly traded, the certification must be provided to the SEC, together 
with annual filings required under the securities laws.  For non-public companies, the 
certification must be filed with the Treasury.  See also Bachelder, supra note 211, at 9.  But 
see Dodd Letter to SEC Details Effective Dates of “Say on Pay” and Compliance 
Certification, CCH FIN. CRISIS NEWS CTR., Feb. 23, 2009, at ¶ 6, 
http://www.financialcrisisupdate.com/2009/02/dodd-letter-to-sec-details-effective-dates-of-
Say-on-Pay-and-compliance-certification.html (“Senator Dodd said that, because the 
certification requirement relates to compliance with executive compensation and corporate 
governance standards that Treasury has yet to establish, this requirement has not become 
effective.  Thus, CEOs and CFOs need not certify as to their company’s compliance until 
the standards have been established.”). 
 225. Brady Dennis, Pay Package for AIG Chief to Be Approved, Compensation Czar to 
Back $10.5 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2009, at A16 (“Feinberg, who was named czar in 
June, has sole discretion to set compensation for the five top senior executives plus the 20 
highest-paid people after them at each of seven bailed-out companies – AIG, Citigroup, 
Bank of America, General Motors, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial and GMAC.  Under the 
administration’s initiative to curb excessive pay, each company also must receive his 
approval for how it pays the rest of its 100 most highly compensated employees.”); Deborah 
Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at A2. 
 226. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, 
supra, note 152, at 50. 
 227. Id. 
 228. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., Special Master for Executive Compensation, 
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On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration released its permanent 
financial regulatory reform plan (“Reform Plan”),229 which lays out its 
comprehensive plan to reform the financial industry, including future 
regulatory and legislative initiatives that regulate key financial industry 
players, such as the credit rating agencies, and the creation of a consumer 
protection agency.230  Further, the Reform Plan calls for the Treasury and 
HUD to develop recommendations on the future structure and viability of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.231 
The Reform Plan contains several initiatives that affect executive 
compensation and corporate governance standards.  Under the auspice of 
strengthening capital and other prudential standards for all banks and bank 
holding companies, the plan directs federal regulators to “issue standards 
and guidelines to better align executive compensation practices of financial 
firms with long-term shareholder value and to prevent compensation 
practices from providing incentives that could threaten the safety and 
soundness of supervised institutions.”232 
As part of its regulatory efforts, the Reform Plan calls for increasing 
SEC disclosure requirements regarding executive compensation.233  In the 
past, the SEC carved out an exemption to its detailed executive 
compensation disclosure requirements if publishing the data would put a 
corporation at a competitive disadvantage in its industry.234  Corporations 
generally interpreted this as justification for not reporting short-term 
performance-based goals, which essentially provided them with further 
motivation to structure executive compensation based on short-term 
performance.235  While the Reform Plan’s SEC disclosure directive lacks 
specificity, increased requirements may include revoking this exemption 
for financial firms and requiring the reporting of all performance-related 
 
http://www.financialstability.gov/about/spcMaster.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 229. U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter REFORM 
PLAN]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., President Obama To Announce Comprehensive 
Plan For Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg_06172009.html. 
 230. REFORM PLAN, supra note 229 at 46, 55. 
 231. Id. at 41. 
 232. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 13 (“Strengthen Supervision and 
Regulation of Securitization Markets[:]…Regulators should promulgate additional 
regulations to align compensation of market participants with longer term performance of 
the underlying loans.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 233. Id. at 30. 
 234. See Gretchen Morgenson, If the Pay Fix Is In, Good Luck Finding It, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 7, 2008, at B1, B7 (describing a perceived “loophole” in the disclosure requirement). 
 235. See id. (detailing low participation: in 2007, 62 percent of companies disclosed 
long-term incentive pay but only 47 percent of companies disclosed short-term incentive 
pay). 
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goals and benchmarks. 
As a backstop to executive compensation and corporate governance 
regulatory efforts, the plan supports legislation in two areas “to increase 
transparency and accountability in setting executive compensation.”236  
First, the plan indicates the Obama administration’s willingness to “support 
legislation requiring all public companies to hold non-binding shareholder 
resolutions on the compensation packages of [SEOs]” (emphasis added).237  
And second, it proposes legislation “giving the SEC the power to require 
that [financial industry] compensation committees are more independent” 
and giving the SEC the power to adopt an expansive independence 
standard.238 
The Obama administration’s support for non-binding Say-on-Pay 
shareholder resolutions is long-standing.  In 2007, the Shareholder Vote on 
Executive Compensation Act passed the House of Representatives and 
then-Senator Obama sponsored the bill in the Senate before it died in 
committee.239  In February 2009, following Obama administration 
 
 236. REFORM PLAN, supra note 229, at 30. 
 237. Id. at 11, 73: 
Public companies should be required to implement “say on pay” rules, 
which require shareholder votes on executive compensation packages.  
While such votes are nonbinding, they provide a strong message to 
management and boards and serve to support a culture of performance, 
transparency, and accountability in executive compensation.  
Shareholders are often concerned about large corporate bonus plans in 
situations in which they, as the company's owners, have experienced 
losses.  Currently, these decisions are often not directly reviewed by 
shareholders – leaving shareholders with limited rights to voice their 
concerns about compensation through an advisory vote.  To facilitate 
greater communication between shareholders and management over 
executive compensation, public companies should include on their 
proxies a nonbinding shareholder vote on executive compensation.  
Legislation that would authorize SEC “say on pay” rules for all public 
companies could help restore investor trust by promoting increased 
shareholder participation and increasing accountability of board 
members and corporate management.  It would provide shareholders of 
all public U.S. companies with the same rights that are accorded to 
shareholders in many other countries.” 
 238. Id. at 30 (“Under this legislation, compensation committees would be given the 
responsibility and the resources to hire their own independent compensation consultants and 
outside counsel. The legislation would also direct the SEC to create standards for ensuring 
the independence of compensation consultants, providing shareholders with the confidence 
that the compensation committee is receiving objective, expert advice.”). 
 239. H.R. Comm. on Fin. Serv., Executive Compensation, 
http://www.house.gov/financialservices/ExecutiveCompensation.html (last visited Oct. 7, 
2009); The Libr. of Cong., Thomas Bill Summary and Status – S.1181, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN01181:|/bss/110search.html (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2009) (last major action by Senate: referred to Senate committee); Govtrack.us, H.R. 
1257: Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, 
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directives, SEC Chairwoman Mary Schapiro named Kayla Gillen as senior 
advisor responsible for spearheading projects on proxy access and Say-on-
Pay shareholder resolutions.240  The practice became temporarily 
mandatory for certain TARP recipients under Treasury guidance issued 
under EESA and then under ARRA statutory requirements.  Further, the 
Obama administration is well aware of support for this practice by 
corporate governance groups and institutional investors, with their efforts 
producing Say-on-Pay proposals at over 100 companies in 2009.241 
The support for legislation authorizing the SEC to enact compensation 
committee independence requirements is based on several factors.  First, 
the Obama administration is well aware of compensation committee 
conflict of interest issues.  For example, in 2006, the Congressional 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform investigated the 
independence of compensation consultants at the 250 largest publicly- 
traded companies from 2002 to 2006.242  Its report includes findings that the 
use of conflicted consultants is pervasive (113 of the Fortune 250 
companies used conflicted consultants), and that the use of conflicted 
consultants resulted in executive pay increases two times faster than cases 
where independent consultants are used.243  Second, support for this 
legislation is likely based, in part, on past, albeit broader, failed 
congressional legislation.  In 2008, the Corporate Executive Compensation 
Accountability and Transparency Act,244 introduced by then-Senator 
Hillary Clinton, would have required the SEC to establish specific 
disclosure requirements that define “independence” for purposes of public 
companies and their compensation consultants.245  Third, support for this 
legislation is based on concerns about the SEC’s potential lack of authority 
to promulgate general corporate governance standards outside of disclosure 
 
http://govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-1257 (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 240. Say on Pay Rising on SEC Agenda, CTR. ON EXEC. COMP., Feb. 20, 2009, 
http://www.execcomp.org/news/news-story.aspx?ID=470. 
 241. PR Newswire, Socially Responsible Investors, Labor, Pension Funds Weigh In: 14 
Bank Bailout Recipients Facing Say-on-Pay Resolutions Should Commit Now to Adopt 
Policy, AJAXWORLD, Feb. 24, 2009, http://ca.sys-con.com/node/853049; Hastings Group, 
Among the Companies Receiving “Say on Pay” Shareholder Proposals in 2009, 
http://hastingsgroup.com/SOP2009.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
 242. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVT. REFORM, 110TH CONG., 
EXECUTIVE PAY: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS, i (Comm. 
Print 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071205100928.pdf. 
 243. See id. at i, ii; Linda Rappaport, Hot Issues In Executive Compensation and 
Corporate Governance, 1710 PLI/CORP 717, 724 (2009). 
 244. S. 2866, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 245. Broc Romanek & Dave Lynn, Senator Clinton’s New Executive Compensation Bill, 
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, May 13, 2008, 
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/001797.html. 
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areas absent a statutory mandate.246  Publicly-traded corporations generally 
adopt corporate governance standards that are mandated by the SROs or 
have become well-established, good corporate governance standards in the 
industry.  Absent a statutory mandate, the SEC has rarely stepped into the 
role of developing corporate governance standards. 
As this article goes to print, Special Master Feinberg, the Treasury and 
the SEC (among other regulatory agencies) are adopting new executive 
compensation limitations, corporate governance restrictions and disclosure 
requirements related to executive compensation.  For example, in October 
2009, Special Master Feinberg released his first ruling on compensation, 
applicable to the then remaining seven firms that received exceptional 
assistance under TARP (AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, Chrysler, GM, 
GMAC, and Chrysler Financial).247  The ruling includes restrictions on cash 
compensation bonuses, limits base salaries to $500,000 or less for more 
than ninety percent of the recipients’ employees, and ties the vast majority 
of total compensation to restricted company stock.248  It is clear from this 
flurry of activity that executive compensation will remain the centerpiece 
of the Obama administration’s Reform Plan. 
 
 
B. The Limitations of EESA & ARRA’s Temporary Restrictions & the 
Obama Administration’s Proposed Permanent Federalization of 
Executive Compensation & Corporate Governance Standards 
 
EESA and ARRA’s temporary restrictions on executive compensation 
and corporate governance were not designed to address the major root 
causes of the systemic failure of the financial industry, have had little 
impact on the way the financial industry conducts its business, and should 
not serve as a template for the Obama administration’s federalization of 
executive compensation and corporate governance requirements.  Further, 
the Obama administration Reform Plan’s executive compensation and 
corporate governance standards fall short of changing corporate America’s 
focus on the short-term.  There are numerous reasons for the 
aforementioned conclusions. 
First, with respect to TARP’s oversight of recipients’ financial 
 
 246. See Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive 
Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate 
Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 1013 (2004) (“[T]he SEC's power 
to promulgate corporate governance standards outside the realm of those mandated by 
federal law is uncertain.”). 
 247. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treas., The Special Master for TARP Executive 
Compensation Issues First Rulings (updated Oct. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg_102220009e.html. 
 248. Id. 
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activities, many of the financial institutions that received TARP funds have 
repaid or are in the process of repaying TARP funds before the end of the 
TARP period.249  As of August 1, 2009, ten large financial institutions and 
numerous smaller institutions had paid back TARP funds.250  The early 
repayment is problematic because it removes financial institutions from 
federal government scrutiny without necessarily ensuring that the 
institutions have dealt with the underlying problem of selling or 
renegotiating their toxic MBSs or MBS guarantees.251 
Theoretically, the Obama administration Reform Plan’s regulation of 
the financial industry could replace TARP’s temporary oversight and 
ensure financial viability and sustainability by setting strict standards, such 
as industry debt-to-asset ratio requirements.  While regulation of the 
financial and other related industries is prominently featured in the Obama 
administration’s Reform Plan, the vast majority of regulatory and 
legislative efforts to date address executive compensation and corporate 
governance standards related to executive compensation.  This approach is 
problematic.  It fails to acknowledge the impact of over twenty-five years 
of financial industry deregulation and the importance of reenacting 
 
 249. Originally, under EESA and Treasury requirements, TARP recipients participating 
in programs such as the CPP could not repay funds until the end of the TARP period, 
providing the federal government with extensive oversight.  To ameliorate ARRA’s 
heightened restrictions, Treasury guidance allows certain TARP recipients to repay funds 
early if the recipients can demonstrate to their respective primary regulator (e.g., the Federal 
Reserve, FDIC, or Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) that they are otherwise well-
capitalized.  See U.S. Dep’t of Treas., FAQs Addressing Capital Purchase Program (CPP) 
Changes Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Feb. 26, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPP-FAQs.pdf (answering frequently asked 
questions about redeeming CPP assets); see also Eric Dash, Four Banks Are the First to Pay 
Back Aid Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at B3 (describing four banks’ attempts to escape 
regulation); Matt Jaffe, Goldman Sachs and Other Banks Feel the Heat to Pay Back Bailout 
Billions, ABC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2009, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Politics/Story?id=7337061&page=1 (noting the 
competitive pressure on banks to be quick to repay TARP money); Joseph A. Giannone & 
Mark Felsenthal, Banks Line Up to Throw Off TARP Yoke, REUTERS, May 20, 2009, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN1942182920090520 (detailing the 
Treasury’s attempts to accommodate bankers’ repayment efforts); Garofalo, supra, note 173 
(questioning the prudence of the Treasury’s decision to permit repayment). 
 250. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT BD., QUARTERLY REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2009, 
supra note 152, at 4 (“[A]s of June 30, 2009, 32 institutions had repaid approximately $70 
billion in principal under the CPP, of which more than $68 billion was received from the 10 
largest financial institutions participating in the CPP.”); Ronald D. Orol, Geithner: We Do 
Not Plan to Ask For More Bank Bailout Money, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 3, 2009, 
http://marketwatch.com/story/geithner-we-wont-ask-for-more-bailout-funds-2009-08-03 
(“So far, a group of 10 large financial [sic], as well as a number of smaller banks, have paid 
back TARP funds, bringing the [TARP] fund’s assets to roughly $130 billion, up from $40 
billion the Treasury had available in the program in April.”). 
 251. See Garofalo, supra note 173 (quoting Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner’s concern 
about a toxic-asset market fizzle). 
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historical protections and limitations.  Instead, it overemphasizes the role of 
executive compensation in the financial crisis.  To the extent that 
compensation contributed to increasingly riskier investment activities, 
executive compensation was only a small contributing factor.  Everyone 
from rank-and-file local loan officers at commercial banks to financial 
industry CEOs and GSE executives had a stake in originating and 
securitizing prime and subprime mortgages, with each party along the way 
generating fees for their respective companies and incentive-based 
compensation for executives, highly-compensated employees, and rank-
and-file employees.  Restricting executive compensation only addresses the 
tip of the iceberg.  Moreover, the Reform Plan does not include overall 
restrictions on the level of compensation or how compensation must be 
structured.  It contains a directive to federal regulators to “issue standards 
and guidelines to better align executive compensation practices of financial 
firms with long-term shareholder value and to prevent compensation 
practices from providing incentives that could threaten the safety and 
soundness of supervised institutions.” 252  The directive is problematic 
because numerous regulators will use these ambiguous, inspirational 
standards to establish different requirements to evaluate financial industry 
compensation practices, without necessarily addressing long-term versus 
short-term compensation design. 
Second, TARP’s temporary restrictions on SEO compensation failed 
to alter corporate governance short-term compensation practices, as 
evidenced by recent compensation projections and payments to highly-
compensated employees who are not subject to EESA and ARRA 
restrictions.  For example, based on profits that do not adequately reflect 
TARP obligations or balance sheet toxic assets, the largest investment 
banks were back directing billions to employee compensation within 
months of EESA’s enactment.  In the first quarter of 2009, Goldman Sachs 
set aside $4.7 billion for workers based on short-term performance 
benchmarks.253  By July 2009, Goldman Sachs had “set aside $6.65 billion 
for salary, bonuses and benefits, putting the average Goldman employee on 
pace to earn more than $900,000” in 2009.254  At the end of July 2009, New 
 
 252. REFORM PLAN, supra note 229, at 11; see also id. at 13 (“Strengthen[ing] 
Supervision and Regulation of Securitization Markets[:] . . . Regulators should promulgate 
additional regulations to align compensation of market participants with longer term 
performance of the underlying loans.”). 
 253. See Louise Story, After Off Year, Wall Street Pay Is Bouncing Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 26, 2009, at A1 (“Workers at the largest financial institutions are on track to earn as 
much money this year as they did before the financial crisis began, because of the strong 
start of the year for bank profits.”). 
 254. Kevin Drawbaugh, Congress Gets Pay Bill as Bank Bonuses Swell, REUTERS, July 
16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE56F7CD20090716; see 
also Matt Taibbi, The Real Price of Goldman’s Giganto-Profits, TRUE/SLANT, July 18, 
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York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo issued a report including data 
revealing that the first nine banks to receive bailout funds dished out nearly 
$33 billion in bonuses in 2008, with nearly 4,800 employees taking home 
bonuses over $1 million.255  One of the more egregious examples is 
Citigroup, which paid 738 employees a minimum $1 million bonus at a 
time when the financial institution had lost $27.7 billion and had received 
$45 billion in TARP loans.256  Given the financial industry’s continuing 
short-term compensation practices, placing permanent limits on executive 
compensation will not change the underlying problem of structuring 
compensation based on short-term corporate profitability. 
Third, the TARP clawback did little to solve the financial industry 
balance-sheet problem or recoup ill-gotten gains.257  Clawbacks are 
inherently ineffective.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”)258 includes a clawback provision under which CEOs or CFOs will, 
under certain circumstances, forfeit past incentive or equity-based 
compensation where financial statements contain material misstatements or 
omissions that lead to future corporate earnings restatements.259  SOX’s 
clawback provision has been of little practical use.  It is only enforceable 
by the SEC and does not provide for a corporation’s or its shareholders’ 
maintenance of a private cause of action.260  Its application is limited to a 
 
2009, http://trueslant.com/matttaibbi/2009/07/16/on-goldmans-giganto-profits (“So what's 
wrong with Goldman posting $3.44 billion in second-quarter profits, what's wrong with the 
company so far earmarking $11.4 billion in compensation for its employees? What's wrong 
is that this is not free-market earnings but an almost pure state subsidy.”). 
 255. CUOMO REPORT, supra note 171, at 5; see also Editorial, Banks Should Pay for 
Performance, THE MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 9, 2009, at L4 (summarizing portions of the 
Cuomo Report’s findings). 
 256. CUOMO REPORT, supra note 171, at 5; see also Daniel Carty, Wall St. Salaries on 
Record-Setting Pace, CBSNEWS, Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/10/14/business/econwatch/entry5383886.shtml 
(“Twenty-three major U.S. banks and investment firms are on a pace to dole out $140 
billion in compensation this year, exceeding the pre-crisis levels of 2007, according to a 
Wall Street Journal report.”). 
 257. Note, however, that a corporation’s voluntary adoption of a clawback policy may 
set a tone for good corporate governance.  See Pitofsky & Tulchin, supra note 46 (“During 
the 2008 proxy season, almost 300 companies adopted some form of claw-back provision, a 
stark contrast to four years ago, when only 14 of the world’s major corporations had such 
policies in place.”). 
 258. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 and scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 259. Id. at § 304, 116 Stat. 778 (stating that the provision applies only to restatements 
that result from material noncompliance with a financial reporting requirement and from 
misconduct). 
 260. See, e.g., In re BISYS Group Inc., 396 F.Supp.2d 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding no private right of action); Kogan v. Robinson, 432 F.Supp.2d 1075, 1078 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006) (finding no private right of action); Neer v. Pelino, 389 F.Supp.2d 648, 652 (E.D. 
Pa. 2005) (finding no private right of action). 
MCCLENDONFINAL_FIVE 1/22/2010  5:13:35 PM 
2009] REFORMING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 171 
 
corporation’s CEO or CFO.  It fails to define what constitutes 
“misconduct,” which in effect renders the disgorgement provision 
ineffective absent a criminal conviction.261  Finally, it only applies where an 
accounting restatement is filed.262  Within these limitations, the SEC has 
only been successful in one clawback case, and it involved a stock-option 
backdating scandal.263 
EESA’s and ARRA’s temporary clawbacks may provide a little more 
relief than SOX’s clawback, as the former apply to executives beyond the 
CEO and CFO, are not triggered exclusively by an accounting restatement, 
and apply to inaccuracies relating to other performance metrics (according 
to the Treasury’s expansive interpretation).264  However, the Treasury’s 
recovery under EESA and ARRA’s clawback is still difficult, at best.265  It 
generally applies only to the top five SEOs, and is only extended to twenty 
additional executives where they engage in “material inaccuracies relating 
to other performance metrics used to award bonuses and incentive 
compensation” to calculate their own pay.266  Further, disgorging ill-gotten 
gains is nearly impossible as funds are often dissipated prior to the 
commencement of a disgorgement action.  Moreover, even a complete 
recovery of performance-based compensation will pale in comparison to 
multi-billion dollar corporate losses.267  A permanent clawback provision 
would suffer from the same frailties. 
Fourth, other TARP restrictions failed to provide additional, 
meaningful corporate governance standards.  ARRA’s compensation 
committee “independent director requirement” is not materially different 
 
 261. See Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng, Check Please: Reclaiming Pay From Executives Is 
Tough to Do, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2006, at A1 (noting various companies’ largely 
unsuccessful attempts to use the civil system to recoup bonus money). 
 262. See SEC v. Shanahan, 624 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1078 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (holding that the 
discovery of accounting discrepancies was insufficient and that an actual financial 
restatement was required prior to the SEC seeking clawback remedies under SOX § 304). 
 263. See United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Release No. 20387, 92 SEC Docket 350 (Dec. 6, 2007) (reporting that 
UnitedHealth Group CEO William McGuire agreed to a $468 million settlement that 
included a $7 million civil penalty and reimbursement to the company for incentive and 
equity-based compensation); see also Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, SEC v. 
Brooks,  No. 07-61526 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2007), 2007 WL 3323346 (seeking disgorgement 
in case involving misappropriation of company funds and alleged manipulation of profit 
margins). 
 264. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 189, at 5. 
 265. McClendon, supra note 246, at 975; PATRICK J.  PURCELL, THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY 
AND EMPLOYER STOCK IN RETIREMENT PLANS, CRS REPORT FOR CONG., at CRS-1, available 
at http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9102.pdf. 
 266. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, supra note 189, at 5. 
 267. See TOWERS PERRIN, CLAWBACKS—SOUND IDEA OR SOUND BITE?, 
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=GBR/2008/200811/03Perspectives
Clawback.pdf  (discussing limited recovery under SOX clawback). 
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than standards already imposed by SROs, such as the NYSE and the 
NASDAQ.268  With EESA, ARRA, and Treasury terms, such as 
“unnecessary and excessive risks,” left undefined, compensation 
committees retain significant discretion regarding their analysis of current 
and future incentives and whether SEO incentives or actions promote 
excessive risk-taking. 
The Obama administration’s Reform Plan may be following that same 
murky path.  The Reform Plan’s directive to federal regulators to “issue 
standards and guidelines to better align executive compensation practices 
of financial firms with long-term shareholder value and to prevent 
compensation practices from providing incentives that could threaten the 
safety and soundness of supervised institutions” is ambiguous and, 
potentially, unworkable.269 
And fifth, neither the temporary restrictions nor the Obama 
administration’s Reform Plan addresses some of the executive 
compensation and corporate governance problems highlighted by corporate 
America’s love affair with short-term performance-based compensation.  
For example, other than the “Say-on-Pay” shareholder resolution proposed 
legislation, the plan’s application is generally limited to financial industry 
players.270  In the last decade, Americans have lost billions of dollars 
related to the payment of millions in short-term, mostly equity-based 
executive compensation and corporate governance failures in other 
industries, including the energy industry (Enron Corporation).271  These 
experiences have demonstrated that systemic reform is needed in the 




 268. See NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05(a), 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections/ (follow “Section 3” hyperlink) (“Listed 
companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent 
directors.”); NASDAQ, INC., EQUITY RULES § 5605(d) (2009), 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ (follow “Rule 5000” hyperlink) (“Compensation of the 
chief executive officer of the Company must be determined, or recommended to the Board 
for determination, either by:  (A) Independent Directors constituting a majority of the 
Board's Independent Directors in a vote in which only Independent Directors participate; or 
(B) a compensation committee comprised solely of Independent Directors.”). 
 269. Reform Plan, supra note 229, at 11; see also id. at 13 (“Regulators should 
promulgate additional regulations to align compensation of market participants with longer 
term performance of the underlying loans.”). 
 270. Reform Plan, supra note 229, at 3-4. 
 271. TYSON SLOCUM, BLIND FAITH: HOW DEREGULATION AND ENRON’S INFLUENCE OVER 
GOVERNMENT LOOTED BILLIONS FROM AMERICANS 3 (2001), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Blind_Faith.pdf. 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
As noted in Part II, executive compensation was not the major catalyst 
for the financial crisis.  Instead, a virtually nonexistent federal regulatory 
structure, eviscerated state control, federal government encouragement, and 
pre-2006 record low interest rates and record high home values were the 
main factors underlying the financial industry crisis.  Most of these factors 
can be addressed by re-regulation of the financial industry and related 
industries, such as the credit rating agencies.  The re-regulation template is 
already in place—the Obama Administration’s Reform Plan and its 
requested regulatory and legislative actions could provide the framework 
that reigns in aggressive speculation by the financial industry and protects 
global financial markets. 
While the author of this article does not see multi-million dollar 
compensation packages as inherently bad for corporate long-term 
productivity, she feels the opposite about short-term incentive-based 
compensation for executives and other highly-compensated employees.  
The latter has been a major catalyst in the financial crisis and various other 
corporate catastrophes over the last decade.272  The directive of the Obama 
administration’s Reform Plan to federal regulators to develop 
compensation standards does not go far enough in addressing this problem.  
Case in point, Special Master Feinberg’s compensation limitations on the 
top seven financial institution TARP recipients require the companies to 
pay the vast majority of total compensation in company stock that can be 
sold in one-third increments after a two-year holding period, a minimum 
service requirement, and following TARP repayment obligations.273  The 
continuing emphasis on equity-based compensation divorced from long-
term holding requirements does little to change corporate pay practices 
already adopted by corporate America, align long-term interests of 
shareholders and management, or ensure corporate long-term productivity.   
Federal regulation, Code amendments, and additional listing standards 
by the SROs can fill the gap and help solve corporate “short-termism” and 
corporate governance problems.  Below is a list of a few additional reforms 
that will promote corporate long-term productivity and sustainability by 
reigning in short-term incentive-based compensation for key industry 
players and increasing board productivity.  Other than federal standards 
adopted for critical industries, like the financial industry, the focus should 
be placed on Code amendments and the SROs enacting systemic reforms 
through the implementation of additional listing standards.274 
 
 272. McClendon, supra note 246. 
 273. Press Release, supra note 247. 
 274. McClendon, supra note 246, at 1013: 
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Consistent with the Joint Committee on Taxation’s prior 
recommendations,275 Congress needs to repeal Code Section 162(m).  Code 
Section 162(m) has been a disaster since its enactment.  To combat the 
growing disparity between executive and rank-and-file workers’ pay, in 
1993, Congress enacted Code Section 162(m)’s $1 million limitation on 
non-performance-based compensation for top executives at publicly-traded 
corporations.276  Instead of reigning in executive pay, Code Section 162(m) 
had two deleterious effects.  First, the limitation encouraged corporate 
America’s adoption of short-term equity-based compensation at the 
expense of long-term corporate productivity.277  Second, the redesigned 
compensation agreements led to a larger disparity between CEO and rank-
and-file worker pay, with CEOs and other SEOs receiving millions in 
equity-based compensation.278  CEO compensation is reportedly now more 
than 400 times the pay of rank-and-file workers.279  Repealing Code 
Section 162(m) is a first step towards promoting long-term corporate 
 
There are at least three reasons why the SROs are better-suited to enact 
these types of reforms through the implementation of additional listing 
standards.  First, government regulation, albeit through legislative or 
regulatory changes, is less flexible and ill-suited to responding to market 
changes.  Second, the SEC's power to promulgate corporate governance 
standards outside the realm of those mandated by federal law is uncertain.  
Third, the SROs possess the expertise and legitimacy to adopt additional 
corporate governance listing standards, with the SROs historically serving 
as an indirect federal regulation in that realm. 
 275. Joint Comm. on Tax’n, 108th Cong., 1 Report of Investigation of Enron 
Corporation and Related Entities Regarding Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and 
Policy Recommendations, at 43 (2003) ("The Joint Committee staff recommends that the 
[Code Section 162(m)] limitation be repealed, and that any concerns regarding the amount 
and types of compensation be addressed through laws other than the Federal income tax 
laws."). 
 276. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (limiting the top five highly paid employees, including the 
CEO and the CFO); see The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Pay: Hearing Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 
102d Cong. 1 (1991) (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman of Subcommittee) 
(explaining the policy behind the Code amendment). 
 277. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem 17 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9813, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9813; see also McClendon, supra note 246, at 994-99 (noting 
that the internal design of equity-based compensation promotes corporate short-termism). 
 278. Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15.3 J. OF APPLIED 
CORP. FIN. 21, 24 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=42417orDOI:10.2139/ssm; 
KEVIN F. HALLOCK & JUDIT TOROK, TOP EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN 2008 (2008), 
available at http://www.conference-board.org/publications/describe.cfm?id=1583. 
 279. Eve Tahmincioglu, Can Wild CEO Pay Be Tamed? Probably Not, MSNBC, Oct. 1, 
2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26963309/print/1/displaymode/1098; see also Carl 
Levin, Pay Gap Between CEOs and Workers Now a Chasm, STATE NEWS SERV., June 8, 
2007, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=275778 (“[T]oday, the average CEO 
is paid nearly 400 times as much as the average worker.”). 
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productivity. 
The SROs can adopt several new listing standards that strengthen 
board accountability and link executive compensation to long-term 
performance.  The SROs can adopt listing standards that mandate all board 
members and corporate executives maintain equity positions in the 
institution and thereby align board members’ and executives’ interests with 
shareholders’ interests and long-term corporate productivity.280  The SROs 
can also accomplish this through the enactment of additional listing 
standards for boards’ compensation committees.  SRO listing standards can 
mandate the use of targets for long-term productivity, where corporations 
are making decisions on the probability of reaching targets and whether 
incentives encourage acceptable risk for the corporation as a whole.281  
Further, these standards could limit reliance on equity-based compensation.  
For example, in a 2003 study, a commission of the National Association of 
Corporate Directors recommended that publicly-held companies use both 
qualitative and quantitative measures in compensating executives for 
performance, and decrease reliance on stock price as a performance 
measure.282  The additional listing standards can also restrict the sale or 
exchange of equity-based compensation during employees’ term of 
employment, until attainment of a certain age, or following a significant 
holding period, and thus discourage corporate “short-termism.”283 
 
 280. Levin, supra note 279. 
 281. John W. White, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Executive Compensation Disclosure: 
Observations on Year Two and a Look Forward to the Changing Landscape for 2009 (Oct. 
21, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch102108jww.htm. 
 282. ANNALISA BARRETT & PAULA TODD, NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION REPORT ON 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND THE ROLE OF THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE (2003), 
http://www.directorsforum.com/resources/related_articles/NACD_BRC_Report.pdf. 
 283. McClendon, supra note 246, at 1030-31: 
To combat insider ’gaming,’ a term adopted by Professor Hall in 
describing executives' ability to manipulate stock prices to their own 
advantage, additional listing standards can also mandate longer vesting 
periods, holding requirements, and specific exercise dates for all stock 
option grants.  Currently, stock option grants are generally exercisable 
within two to four years following the grant date, do not include 
mandatory holding requirements following the exercise date, and stock 
acquired at exercise is immediately saleable on the open market.  The 
lack of timing restrictions provides a perverse incentive to option 
holders to manipulate stock price within a short time frame.  
Lengthening the vesting period and limiting exercise dates to set periods 
during any given year alleviate some of that incentive.  Mandating 
holding periods promotes management's long-term ownership of equity 
holdings.  Ideally, requiring top management to retain equity holdings 
during their term of employment is the most effective means of focusing 
those executives on the long-term productivity of the corporation; 
however, shorter holding periods, such as attainment of a certain age or 
years of service, may be appropriate. 
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Additional listing standards can require complete board 
independence.284  While most publicly-traded corporations have adopted 
board independence requirements that exceed the SROs’ current “majority 
of independent directors” listing standard,285 both the self-imposed and 
SROs’ standards do not guarantee true board director independence.  For 
example, a few of Citigroup’s directors had multiple roles at the firm, 
including Robert Hernandez Ramirez, who was both a board director and 
chairman of the bank’s Mexican subsidiary.286  Instead of relegating the 
activity to the SEC and forcing its performance in a nontraditional role, the 
SROs can adopt listing standards requiring all board members be 
independent and then redefine independence to ensure that board members 
have limited social and economic dependence on the corporation. 
Stronger efforts should be made to separate CEO and board chair 
positions.  Where the CEO also functions as the board chair, the CEO 
retains disproportionate influence over board decisions.  While some 
progress has been made through corporations’ voluntary separation of the 
CEO and board chair positions, with approximately forty-six percent of 
public companies reporting that their CEOs do not serve as the board chair, 
these voluntary efforts are progressing at too slow of a rate, with only a five 
percent increase in separation from 2007 to 2008.287  The SROs can adopt 
an independent chair, lead director, or presiding director corporate 
governance model.288  That model can, however, be flexible, depending on 
 
 284. Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC to Examine Boards’ Role in Financial Crisis, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 20, 2009, at D1. 
 285. Shearman & Sterling, LLP, 2008 Trends In Corporate Governance of the Largest 
US Public Companies, General Governance Practices, 14 (on file with author and available 
from firm on request) (In its sixth annual survey of selected corporate governance practices 
of the Top 100 Companies, 2008 Trends In Corporate Governance Of The Largest US 
Public Companies General Governance Practices, 52 of the top 100 companies surveyed 
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be comprised of Independent Directors as defined in Rule 5605(a)(2).  The Company must 
disclose in its annual proxy (or, if the Company does not file a proxy, in its Form 10-K or 
20-F) those directors that the board of directors has determined to be independent under 
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1,500 COMPANIES, (2008), http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/BP2009.pdf. 
 288. THE CONF. BD. COMM’N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2003), http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SR-03-04.pdf 
(recommending that either (1) the role of the Chairman and CEO be performed by different 
individuals, with the Chairman being one of the independent directors; (2) the role of the 
Chairman and CEO be performed by different individuals, with the Chairman not a member 
of the management team and not directly reportable to the CEO; or (3) for those 
corporations that do not bifurcate the CEO and Chairman positions, the appointment or 
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corporate size and industry; but it must specifically delineate the chair, lead 
director, or presiding director’s role in compensation and risk-assessment 
matters, so the CEO does not effectively retain power over board 
decisions.289 
The SROs can adopt a listing standard that limits board members’ 
service on multiple boards at the same time.  One of the causes of the 
financial industry crisis was boards’ failures to assess the risks associated 
with heavy concentrations of MBSs and other collateralized debt 
obligations.290  Arguably, part of this failure is due to board members’ 
service on multiple boards.291  For example, several of the directors on the 
Bear Stearns board served on the boards of four public companies.292  
While fifty-five of the top 100 companies place a limit on the number of 
boards a director may serve on, it is not uncommon to find a company 
director serving on five or six boards.293  With sixty-five of the top 100 
companies surveyed having eight or more board meetings every year, how 
can a board member with multiple commitments to other companies and a 
total of over forty meetings a year in some cases parse through complicated 
and creative arrangements and make risk assessments?  Limiting service on 
multiple boards will lead to better-educated directors. 
For certain critical industries, the SROs can adopt listing standards 
that require board members to have experience in the industry in which 
they serve.  Listing standards already require that audit committee members 
be financially literate and that at least one member of the audit committee 
have auditing experience.294  Requiring board members to have experience 
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fund managers, and finance officials were calling for a sweeping overhaul of the business 
practices of the NYSE including a demand that the NYSE separate the roles of chairman 
and CEO). 
 289. McClendon, supra note 246, at 1014 (“To achieve the desired effect, however, the 
additional listing standards must require that the duties of the non-executive chair, lead 
director, or presiding director be adequately delineated . . . ”). 
 290. See Goldfarb, supra note 284 (“With few exceptions, boards have received little 
media attention as the country has sought explanations for financial firms’ taking on such 
perilous risks.  These boards . . . were ultimately responsible for the decisions of the Wall 
Street companies, housing firms and banks at the heart of the crisis.  The boards signed off 
on the risks the companies took and the compensation packages awarded to top 
executives.”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. NYSE, INC., Listed Company Manual, supra note 268, at § 303A.07: 
Each member of the audit committee must be financially literate, as 
such qualification is interpreted by the listed company's board in its 
business judgment, or must become financially literate within a 
reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit 
MCCLENDONFINAL_FIVE 1/22/2010  5:13:35 PM 
178 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
in the particular industry helps ensure that they understand management 
proposals, complex transactions, and the value of particular corporate 
executives. 
In conclusion, EESA, ARRA, and the Obama administration’s Reform 
Plan have set the tone for corporate governance reforms in the area of 
executive compensation and corporate governance.295  But, actual 
implementation of federal regulatory and legislative reforms in this area are 
problematic and do not go far enough to change executive compensation 
“corporate culture.”  In evaluating and implementing systemic reform of 
executive compensation and corporate governance related to executive 
compensation, it is imperative that Congress, the Obama administration and 
federal regulatory agencies look at the root causes of the financial crisis 
and evaluate whether additional statutory, regulatory, or corporate 
governance standards can effectively encourage responsibility by all 
corporate players.  Further, Congress, the Obama administration, and 
federal regulatory agencies must determine whether they are the best 
source for implementing corporate governance standards relating to 
executive compensation or whether another source, such as the SROs, will 
be more effective in implementing specific changes.  Finally, a 
determination needs to be made regarding the expansion of reforms outside 
of the financial industry and to corporate America as a whole.  The author 
of this article takes the position that federalization of permanent executive 
compensation corporate governance reforms is generally inappropriate and 
that the SROs can more effectively enact additional listing standards for all 
publicly-traded corporations.  Further, the recommended reforms will not 
have the drastic effect of limiting corporations’ abilities to attract talented 
executives, a concern expressed by many opposed to compensation 
 
committee.  In addition, at least one member of the audit committee 
must have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the 
listed company's board interprets such qualification in its business 
judgment.  While the Exchange does not require that a listed company's 
audit committee include a person who satisfies the definition of audit 
committee financial expert set out in Item 401(h) of Regulation S-K, a 
board may presume that such a person has accounting or related 
financial management expertise. 
 295. Sheri Qualters, supra note 193; Greg E. Gordon, Practicing Law Institute, 
Preparation of Annual Disclosure Documents, Executive Compensation Limits For 
Financial Institutions Participating In The Troubled Asset Relief Program, 1710 PLI/Corp 
903, 905 (2009) (“The limitations and restrictions adopted as part of the U.S. Treasury's 
Troubled Asset Relief Program could serve as a model for comprehensive executive 
compensation reform legislation.  In addition, these compensation restrictions may have a 
wider impact to the extent non-participating companies adopt policies similar to those 
required by EESA or to the extent that implementation of the EESA compensation 
restrictions becomes the ‘model’ of good corporate governance.”). 
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limitations.296  Regardless of the means to the end, corporate America’s 
short-term productivity rewards for high-level executives and other highly-
compensated employees should be abandoned.  Future reforms for all of 
corporate America will ensure that corporate employees are rewarded for 
their long-term productivity and not their generation of short-term gains. 
 
 296. Matthew Jaffe, House Approves Executive Pay Limits, ABC NEWS, July 31, 2009, 
http://i.abcnews.com/Politics/Story?id=8213911&page=1 (“The industry also contends that 
compensation caps will limit the ability of companies to attract top talent in a competitive 
field.”). 
